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ABSTRACT 
 
ISIJI, BERYL S. Is Microfinance the Best Tool for Empowerment? Analysis of Efficiency 
of Developing Economies’ Microfinance Institutions in Empowering Women using 
Data Envelopment Analysis Meta frontier Technology, Department of Economics, 
June 2018.  
ADVISOR: S. Yaisawarng 
Poverty is still prevalent in developing economies, although the proportion of 
people living below the international poverty line ($1.90 a day) decreased by 24.6% 
between 1990 and 2013 according to World Bank. Women are more likely than men to live 
in poverty due to minimal access to resources. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) lend small 
funds to women thereby empowering them, encouraging entrepreneurship and creating 
creditworthiness. 
This thesis examines the effect of MFIs on gender inequality via women 
empowerment by calculating output-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis using the meta 
frontier technology, and relating the efficiency results to the Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
obtained from the United Nations Human Development database. The sample is from Mix 
Market database between 2002-2016, including MFIs in 17 countries across 5 regions. This 
thesis tests the null hypothesis that efficiency scores of MFIs and GII are not linearly 
related, against the alternative, efficiency scores and GII are inversely related. Rejecting 
the null indicates that MFIs play a critical role in empowering women, thus reducing 
inequality. 
This thesis did not find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Though an 
in-depth analysis of frequent peers on the meta frontier, such as Spandana and Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), show that MFIs can potentially reduce poverty levels and 
empower women. This thesis can be used by policy makers as a reference on how to 
implement policies. focus on the structure and management of MFI programs like 
incorporating government funding and equipping women with vocational training skills. 
  
 iii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
Abstract   ii 
Chapter 1  Introduction 1 
    
Chapter 2  Studies on Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions 5 
2.1   Objectives of Microfinance Institutions 6 
2.2  Specification of Microfinance Institutions 9 
2.3  Subsidies as an Integral Part of Microfinance Institutions 10 
2.4  Women Participation in the Leadership of Microfinance 
Institutions 
11 
2.5  Conclusion 12 
    
Chapter 3  Formulation of the Analytical Model 13 
3.1  Background on DEA Model 14 
3.2  Illustration of Output Oriented Technical Efficiency 15 
3.3  Linear Programming Formulation for Variable Returns to 
Scale 
17 
3.4  Meta Frontier Production Technology 18 
3.5  Hypothesis Tests 20 
    
Chapter 4  Empirical Test of the Theory 22 
4.1  Data and Variables  23 
4.2  Outlier and Descriptive Analysis 27 
4.3  Efficiency and Hypothesis Tests Results  32 
 4.3.1 Meta Frontier Efficiency Scores 32 
 4.3.2 Efficiency Score for DMUs by Region 37 
 4.3.3 Evaluation of GAP Values by Region 39 
 4.3.4 Hypothesis Testing Results for Efficiency Score  40 
 4.3.5 Ranking of Efficiency Scores in Models 1 and 2 42 
 iv 
 
 4.3.6  Correlation between Efficiency Scores and Gender Inequality 
Index 
43 
4.4  Results Conclusion  46 
    
Chapter 5  Conclusion 47 
  Bibliography 50 
  Appendices 53 
 1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Poverty is still prevalent among people living in developing economies mainly 
located in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. According to a report by World Bank, the 
poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day decreased from 35.3% in 1990 to 10.7% in 
2013(World Bank, 2016). Though poverty levels seem to have decreased, there is high 
concentration of the people still living below the poverty line within developing economies. 
The international poverty line is below $1.90 a day. Women make up a higher percentage 
of people living below the poverty line. This is further influenced by cultural norms that 
limit women’s eligibility to any form of loan, unless approved or supported by the husband. 
Therefore, the economic growth within women is stagnated making them entirely reliant 
on their husbands. 
In 1974, Muhammad Yunus introduced the microfinance institutions (MFI) system 
through the formation of Grameen bank (Grameen bank, 2018). This system allowed 
women, who would have otherwise been excluded by the normal banking system, to 
borrow small amounts of money for development related causes. Women could come in 
groups and borrow money for small businesses then repay it later in installments. Banerjee 
(2013) explains that borrowing in groups made it easier for group monitoring and reducing 
the risks of default. This is because each member of the group is responsible for the debt 
that needs to be repaid. If the debt is not repaid, then it risks the whole group from getting 
another loan. Therefore, members look out each other for and support those unable to pay 
in a timely manner. Group borrowing has encouraged women in these communities to get 
close together enforcing unity. Since then, this microfinance institution idea has spread 
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across the world, with more focus on developing economies, where most women are 
poverty stricken. Over the years, this system has been viewed to be efficient in eradicating 
poverty, through empowering women in the societies, by providing finances for 
entrepreneurial activities ranging from small to medium size businesses, and in turn 
increasing the family income. Since then MFIs have played a role of reducing poverty 
level, through outreach and being financially sustainable over a long time. 
Measuring the efficiency of MFIs is important because it will help the organizations 
understand how to use the available resources to maximize output in the communities. 
Additionally, governments would be encouraged to be more involved in this sector, rather 
than solely relying on Non-Governmental Organizations. This may be done through the 
incorporation of funding towards the microfinance institutions into the annual budgeting 
and spending process to ensure constant provision of subsidies and other resources.  This 
is clearly illustrated by Burgess and Pande (2005), by evaluating the effects of the 1:4 
banking license policy by the Central bank of India on the poverty levels in unbanked areas. 
The authors analyzed the importance of rural banks under state implemented initiatives. 
According to the authors, the Central bank of India introduced a 1:4 policy where banks 
were required to open four other branches in selected unbanked area when they open any 
new branch in an already banked area. Because of this initiative, there was evidence of 
reduced poverty, increased saving habits among the people, and increased access to loan 
to families. From this illustration, it is important for governments to understand and take 
part in ensuring proper financial development infrastructure within the country and 
implementation of policies that would strengthen financial institutions through governing 
its operation activities for the good of the people. It is therefore important to note that, 
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under the cases where countries have more developed financial infrastructure through equal 
access to banking services to citizens and implementation of policies that govern the 
operation of the bank, there might be low significant results showing the relationship 
between efficiency scores of MFI and the Gender Inequality Index. This is because women 
have already experienced empowerment and are working to close the existing gap between 
them and men. In this case, microfinance institutions may not play that major of a role in 
bringing about a transformative effect of women empowerment within the societies. 
This thesis argues that microfinance institutions could reduce the gender inequality 
by empowering women. Furthermore, it hypothesizes that efficiency scores of 
microfinance institutions are inversely related to gender inequality index. That is, as the 
efficiency score of a microfinance institution increases, the gender inequality index 
decreases, and vice versa. To explore this research, data of microfinance institutions was 
obtained from Mix Market database. The data covered a period of 14 years from 2002 to 
2016 to get a clear pattern of the impact of microfinance institutions on women as the 
spread and acceptance of MFIs takes shape in various parts of the world. The data was 
collected from MFIs in 15 different countries from South Asia and East Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Middle East and North Africa and Latin America regions. 
By applying an output oriented Meta frontier Data Envelopment Analysis, with one 
of the output variables, the number of women borrowers in the MFIs, directly measuring 
women empowerment, the anticipated results will provide an understanding on how 
microfinance institutions have used its limited resources to bring about positive changes in 
the communities through output expansion and financial sustainability. O’Donnell et al 
(2008) define meta frontier as the boundary consisting of all the groups in the data with 
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unrestricted technology. Thus, this method allows for comparison of efficiency scores 
across the different groups on the meta frontier. In this thesis, this method will enable the 
comparison of efficiency scores of microfinance institutions in one region to those in 
another region on the meta frontier despite the difference in culture, resources, and 
organizational structure. 
The null hypothesis test is efficiency scores are not linearly related to the Gender 
Inequality Index against the alternative hypothesis that, efficiency scores and Gender 
Inequality Index are inversely related. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that 
microfinance efficiency scores and Gender Inequality Index are inversely related such that 
as the efficiency score increases, the gender inequality index decreases, and vice versa. 
Therefore, microfinance institutions reduce the gender inequality by empowering women 
in the society. 
This thesis did not find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that efficiency 
scores are related to the Gender Inequality Index. Though an in-depth analysis of the 
frequent peers on the meta frontier, such as Spandana and Vietnam Bank for Social Policies 
(VBSP), reveals that there is potential for microfinance institutions to create a positive 
impact on reducing poverty levels and empowering women in the societies.   
This thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter discusses past studies on efficiency 
of microfinance institutions while the third chapter explains the formulation of the 
analytical model. The fourth chapter explores empirical test of the theory, and the fifth 
chapter is the conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
Studies on Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions 
This chapter explores the previous studies carried out by different researchers on 
measuring efficiency of microfinance institutions in various countries in the world. The 
outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the objective of microfinance 
institutions which helps readers understand the reason behind the introduction of 
microfinance institutions in the developing economies. Furthermore, it also explains the 
different ways of measuring social efficiency or financial sustainability. Section 2.2 
explores the specification of MFIs and clearly outlines the various applied models whether 
intermediate or production, variables used by the researches as well as the results obtained. 
Section 2.3 presents subsidies as an integral part of the MFIs and further explains its effect 
on the ability of microfinance institutions to achieve its optimal efficiency. Section 2.4 
explains women participating in the MFI leadership, and Section 2.5 highlights the 
contribution of this research. 
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2.1 Objectives of Microfinance Institutions 
The objectives of microfinance institutions include financial sustainability, 
outreach, women empowerment and reducing poverty levels among others. There are 
various research papers that have covered on the efficiency of Microfinance institutions in 
addressing these objectives.  Gobezie (2010) states that MFIs are mainly associated with 
women.  This is because the existing gender inequality acts as a barrier to economic 
development and growth in the communities. The author also emphasizes that women have 
a better repayment rate of loan and more commitment, thus contribute to the overall 
efficiency and sustainability of a MFI. The author mentions that access to MFI by women 
increases their bargaining power in the family. This is because women can now generate 
income contributing to the overall household income and can have more say on the running 
and expenditure in the household. Furthermore, it encourages independence among 
women. 
Lebovics, Hermes, and Hudon (2016) analyzed whether the financial and social 
efficiency of a microfinance institution are independent of each other, in achieving its 
objective of outreach and financial sustainability, using Vietnam as a case study.  The 
authors used different output variables to capture financial and social outputs. In the case 
of financial sustainability, gross loan portfolio and financial revenue are the outputs used. 
For social output, the authors used number of depositors and then constructed a poverty 
outreach measure. To construct the poverty outreach measure, focus can be on the breadth 
or depth of the outreach. Lebovics, Hermes, and Hudon (2016) focused on both the breadth 
(number of poor clients reached) multiplied by the depth (extent to which the poor clients 
are reached). Therefore, the authors divided the average loan balance per borrower in each 
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MFI by the average annual income in the MFI’s operating area, to obtain a value denoted 
as ki. The lower the value of ki obtained, the smaller the average loan. To capture the depth 
of the outreach, the authors first standardized the ki value to fall within the (0,1) range using 
the formula as shown below: 
𝑝𝑖 = 1 − [
𝑘𝑖 − min(𝑘)
max(𝑘) − min(𝑘)
] 
The range of the k value consists of k values obtained from other MFIs within the same 
operating area. The closer the value of p is to one, it implies that the depth of outreach is 
higher. The p value obtained is then multiplied by the number of active borrowers in the 
MFI to examine the depth and breadth of the outreach. Therefore, social efficiency for a 
given microfinance institution is defined as being able to give numerous amount of small 
loans to the poor people. 
Bassem (2008) investigated the efficiency of Microfinance institutions in the 
Mediterranean region, with a slight emphasis on the social efficiency, by looking at the 
depth and breadth of spread in the community. The author multiplied number of borrowers 
by the percentage of women to obtain the social performance of the microfinance 
institution. He further explains the breadth of the MFI program is reflected by the number 
of borrowers, while the depth is shown by selecting the percentage of women in the 
MFI.  Microfinance institution system in the Mediterranean region is viewed as strong and 
more developed compared to other regions. Bassem (2008) explains that microfinance 
institutions in these regions have access to local funds as a way of refinancing and 
improving of financial services to areas without infrastructure, further leading to economic 
growth and development. This explains why the MFIs in the Mediterranean region might 
have a higher efficiency score compared to other regions.  Widiarto and Emrouznejad 
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(2015) specifically examined the social and financial efficiency of the Islamic 
Microfinance institutions across the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and Pacific 
and South Asia. They used assets, operating expense, portfolio at risk 30 days as inputs 
and financial revenue and borrowers as outputs. They covered all forms of MFIs including 
NGOs, global banks, and local banks. 
With a further regional focus, Segun and Anjugam (2013) evaluated the efficiency 
of MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa in reducing poverty levels and promoting financial stability 
within the organization. The authors found two efficient peers in Kenya and Senegal, which 
further support the idea that a microfinance institution does fulfil its objective of reducing 
poverty levels and empowering women. Bezboruah and Pillai’s (2014) objective was to 
evaluate the effects of the characteristics of microfinance institution such as organization, 
efficiency, loan size, gender mix, legal status among others on the portion of women 
borrowers. The authors highlighted the effect of loan size made available to customers by 
a microfinance institution on number of women borrowers’ present. When the average loan 
size is low, more poor women are targeted since they can easily repay the money. When 
the loan size is high, most poor women tend not to participate in the borrowing activity. 
This explains why most women would participate more in NGO based MFIs since they 
have lower average size of loan and explains why MFI system is easily adaptable and 
accessible to more people because of the attractiveness of the loan size.  Additionally, 
Bezboruah and Pillai’s (2014) further explain the reason why microfinance institutions 
mainly target women as their main clients. This is because of the role they play in the 
society, therefore providing access to loans will increase the women’s economic 
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independence. This in turn will bridge the gender inequality gap, leading to more economic 
growth and development in the society. 
Banerjee (2013) highlights some of the details of microfinance over the last two 
decades of its existence. He highlights the difference between money lenders and MFI 
behavior with a reference to Pakistan. From this he concludes that money lenders tend to 
be selective in whom they offer lending service to. Money lenders are more likely to lend 
to existing clients rather than new clients, whereas on the other hand, MFIs can lend to 
anyone that lives within the area and meets their criteria which are very simple.  The author 
also finds clear evidence that microcredit under reasonable rates does breed entrepreneurial 
spirit through creation and/or expansion of businesses. Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 
(2015) combined results of six randomized evaluations based in Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Morocco with an aim of analyzing how effective 
MFI is as a tool to promote development.  The authors concluded that there was not much 
transformative change brought about by the MFI system, though they acknowledged that 
it brings about business growth, which might be in a way limited. 
2.2 Specification of Microfinance Institutions 
Microfinance institutions can be viewed either as a production unit or as an 
intermediary. Intermediation approach views financial institutions as intermediaries 
between borrowers and savers, whereas production views financial institutions as a 
production unit that uses standard inputs to produce financial services. The specifications 
of microfinance institutions resemble that of a normal banking system. Muneer and 
Kulshreshtha (2014) highlighted the comparison between the banking industry and the 
microfinance institutions approaches of measuring the efficiency: intermediaries and 
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production approaches. They also point out the different possible outputs and inputs that 
are used by banking institutions, which is applicable to MFIs. The outputs included total 
loans, saving balances, average loan size and number of accounts. Inputs were labor, fixed 
assets and capital among others. Weill (2004) further highlighted the intermediation 
approach of measuring efficiency. The author used loans and investment assets as outputs 
and personnel expenses and interest paid as inputs.  
 On the other hand, Segun, and Anjugam (2013) used both intermediary and 
production approach in evaluating the efficiency of MFIs in the Sub-Saharan Africa in 
reducing poverty and being financially stable. Using Intermediation approach, the output 
was gross loan portfolio and inputs were number of credit officers, and cost per borrower. 
Under the production approach, output was outstanding loan and inputs were number of 
employees which measures the proxy for labor and personal expense which captures the 
proxy for services in support of operation. Therefore, it is possible to apply either of the 
approaches or both to measure the efficiency of MFIs. 
2.3 Subsidies as an Integral Part of the Microfinance Institutions 
 
Microfinance institutions heavily rely on subsidies to carry out their services. 
Muneer and Kulshreshtha (2014) described the several ways in which MFIs raise money 
such as through donors and grants from other sources. Additionally, the authors categorized 
subsidies as assets that are possessed by microfinance institutions and can be transformed 
into cash. Nawaz (2010) investigated the role of subsidies in promoting the efficiency and 
productivity of a microfinance institution. Overall, subsidies determine the amount of 
money an MFI can lend its customers and the number of people it can efficiently serve. 
Azid et al. (2016) examined the nature of Microfinance institutions in Africa in comparison 
 11 
 
to other microfinance institutions in various places in the world. In this study, the authors 
concluded that if microfinance institutions are stable, they will encourage greater risks, and 
have more flexible terms of payment for their active borrowers. Therefore, it is evident that 
the availability of subsidies affects the overall stability of the microfinance institution. 
Banerjee (2013) investigates the role of reputation in obtaining subsidies for the 
MFI. The author explains that reputation plays a major role in distinguishing between 
traditional microlenders and MFIs.  Most MFIs tend to be associated with social missions 
within the society such as health services, education, supporting poor people among 
others.  The author points out that reputation does serve as a major role in attracting 
different types of donors, determining if they should have aid donors support the 
organization or social businesses. 
2.4 Women Participation in the Leadership of Microfinance Institutions 
Over time, women have started taking leadership roles in Microfinance institutions 
which might have an impact on their efficiency. Bezboruah and Pillai (2014) analyzed the 
effects of women participating in the governance of microfinance institutions in developing 
countries. The authors found that an increase in women borrowers led to an increase in 
women board members, especially in cooperative forms of institutions. Damme, Wijesiri, 
and Meoli (2016) determined the role of governance model in promoting financial 
efficiency in a microfinance institution using Sri Lanka as a case study. The authors used 
several examples of governance models such as size of the board, presence of women on 
board, CEO/chair duality and woman CEO in the organization. Under these scenarios, 
different efficiency levels were obtained within the microfinance institutions. The highlight 
of the paper was, gender diversity does increase the efficiency of MFIs. The authors found 
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that smaller and gender diverse boards are financially efficient and CEO/chair duality and 
presence of a woman CEO have a negative impact on the outreach efficiency in the 
Microfinance institution. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Different authors mentioned above have investigated the efficiency of MFIs in 
achieving their goals of outreach and being financially stable. Additionally, there has been 
literature on how women involvement on governance of the MFIs affects efficiency of the 
institution.  While previous studies have managed to show that microfinance institutions 
have an impact on people’s lives and involvement of women in managerial role does 
influence social and financial efficiency of institutions, there has not been much analysis 
on the empowerment for the women enrolled. This thesis will differ by evaluating the level 
of impact microfinance institutions have had on the women in the societies through social 
outreach and its own sustainability in reducing gender inequality gap. 
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Chapter 3 
Formulation of the Analytical Model 
This chapter explains the formulation of the analytical model used in this thesis. 
This chapter is outlined as follows: Section 3.1 explains the background information of 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model and outlines the various orientation and return 
to scales that can be applied in a DEA model and the overall importance of this model to 
the performance of firm and management. Section 3.2 presents an illustration of output 
oriented technical efficiency highlighting Koopmans and Farrell efficiencies a DMU can 
assume, and how to interpret a technical efficiency score of a given DMU. Section 3.3 
illustrates the Linear Programming formulation used for both output oriented technical 
efficiency and the meta frontier technology. Section 3.4 explains the foundations of meta 
frontier technology for measuring efficiency i.e. meta frontier, group frontier and the GAP. 
This section also emphasizes on the importance of the meta frontier technology in 
improving performance of a DMU. Lastly, Section 3.5 outlines the hypothesis test for this 
thesis. 
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3.1 Background on DEA Model 
Data Envelopment Analysis is used to measure the efficiency of an organization 
within a given group of organizations (Class notes, 2017). There are various types of 
efficiencies that can be obtained using the DEA model such as allocative, cost and 
technical. Coelli (1996) explains that the DEA model is used to compare an organization 
to other efficient peers on the production frontier using weights. Steering Committee for 
the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision (1997) further emphasizes that this 
method benefits management of firms and organizations by enabling them to lead more 
efficiently through finding answers to questions that affect overall productivity. These 
questions include how to select role models for their organization, understanding how 
much further the organization can maximize on output without necessarily increasing the 
input, among others. 
Coelli (1996) explains that DEA model originated from Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes, who proposed an input oriented model at a Constant Return to Scale, and Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper who proposed the Variable Return to Scale. The author also explains 
that Constant Return to Scale is used when all DMUs are at optimal scale.  When DMUs 
are not operating at Constant Return to Scale due to various factors such as finances or any 
other circumstance, the Variable Returns to Scale should be applied. This allows technical 
efficiency to be calculated without any effects of scale. 
There are two approaches under DEA that can be used to calculate the technical 
efficiency depending on the desired outcome. These are the input oriented model and the 
output oriented model. Coelli (1996) illustrates that the difference between the input 
oriented and output oriented model in measuring efficiency is that input oriented model 
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minimizes inputs given a constant output variable, whereas the output oriented model 
maximizes the output given a constant input variable. In this thesis, the output oriented 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) will be used to calculate technical efficiency of a 
microfinance institution at variable returns to scale.  This model is ideal because it will 
enable the evaluation of efficiency of the microfinance institution in utilizing its limited 
resources to attain its goal of women empowerment as its output. 
3.2 Illustration of Output Oriented Technical Efficiency 
Given the same level of inputs, peers B, C, D and E are all efficient; therefore, they 
define the production possibility frontier. A and F are inefficient since they both fall inside 
the frontier and can maximize their outputs proportionally given the constant inputs to A’ 
and F’ respectively. The increase in outputs from F to F’ on the frontier with reference to 
D and E is defined as technical efficiency and is derived from the formula TE = OF/OF’. 
A unit is efficient when the technical efficiency value is equal to 1. On the other hand, it is 
inefficient when the technical efficiency value is less than 1. If the technical efficiency 
score obtained for DMU F is 0.8, it shows that this DMU can produce 80% of maximum 
potential output using the current inputs holding the output mix constant. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of Technical Efficiency 
   
There are two types of efficiencies namely Farrell and Koopmans. A unit on the 
frontier might be either Koopmans or Farrell efficient or both. In figure 1, B, C, and D are 
observed points on the frontier that are both Farrell and Koopmans efficient. E is Farrell 
but not Koopmans efficient. A and F are neither Farrell nor Koopmans efficient points. To 
make A Farrell efficient, it has to move along the ray from the origin through point A to 
A’ which is on the frontier. This movement is known as radial slack. When A’ moves to 
B, there is increase in the level of y1 while y2 remains the same. This implies that A’ is not 
Koopmans efficient point while B is. This increase in quantity of y1 from A’ to B is a non-
radial slack in y1. F’ is Farrell efficient though there is surplus in y2 such that it could move 
to point D to become Koopmans efficient. 
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3.3 Linear Programming Formulation for Variable Returns to Scale 
The Linear Programming formulation below represent an output oriented model. 
Objective is to find TE k = [max 𝜃]-1 
Subject to 
(
𝑦1,1 𝑦2,1 𝑦3,1 − 𝑦𝑗,1
𝑦1,2 𝑦2,2 𝑦3,2 − 𝑦𝑗,2
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑦1,𝑚 𝑦2,𝑚 𝑦3,𝑚 − 𝑦𝑗,𝑚
)     (
𝑧𝑘,1
𝑧𝑘,2
⋮
𝑧𝑘,𝑗
) ≥    (
𝑦𝑘,1
𝑦𝑘,2
⋮
𝑦𝑘,𝑚
) 𝜃                           
(
𝑥1,1   𝑥2,1 𝑥3,1 −   𝑥𝑗,1
𝑥1,2  𝑥2,2 𝑥3,2 −  𝑥𝑗,2
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑥1,𝑛  𝑥2,𝑛 𝑥3,𝑛 − 𝑥𝑗,𝑛
)     (
𝑧𝑘,1
𝑧𝑘,2
⋮
𝑧𝑘,𝑗
) ≤     (
𝑥𝑘,1
𝑥𝑘,2
⋮
𝑥𝑘,𝑛
)                                                 
(
𝑧𝑘,1
𝑧𝑘,2
⋮
𝑧𝑘,𝑗
) ≥0 (non-negativity) 
𝑧𝑘,1 +  𝑧𝑘,2 + ⋯ 𝑧𝑘,𝑗 = 1  
 
𝑗 = 1, … . j is the number of units, and k = unit being assessed  
𝑥𝑛 = input 𝑛, 𝑛 = 1, … . 𝑛 , and 𝑦𝑚 = output 𝑚, 𝑚 = 1, … . 𝑚   
𝑧𝑘,𝑗 = estimated weight for unit 𝑗 when efficiency for unit 𝑘 is calculated  
𝜃 = scale indicating how far unit k needs to expand its output to be effiecient  
The Linear Programming formulation above represents output orientation model 
with variable returns to scale (VRS). It is used to measure the efficiency of DMU k in 
comparison to other DMUs.  The output frontier has the sum of the weighted DMUs with 
respect to DMU k greater than or equal to that of DMU k. The input frontier consists of the 
sum of weighted DMUs with respect to DMU k less than or equal to DMU k. The best 
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frontier is obtained by linear formulation of the DMUs present in the sample. Theta 
indicates how far a DMU needs to expand its output to operate on the frontier. 
  Z represents weight which is unique to each DMU, and efficient peers have weight 
that is greater than zero (Z>0). The non-negativity is equal or greater to zero. Since the 
Linear programming formulation above applies variable returns to scale, the sum of the 
weight (Z) is equal to one. 
3.4 Meta frontier Production Technology 
According to class notes (2017), meta frontier production technology is viewed as 
presenting traditionally conceived neoclassical production functions. O’Donnell et al 
(2008) explained that meta frontier production consists of the groups/regions frontiers and 
the meta frontier. The authors further explained a meta frontier as the boundary consisting 
of all the groups in the data with unrestricted technology, whereas group frontier is the 
restricted technology and consists of only the group data boundary. Additionally, the 
authors described that measuring efficiency using the meta frontier technology is done 
relative to the meta frontier and group frontier, then the GAP is derived as a ratio of meta 
frontier efficiency scores and group frontier efficiency scores.  
The GAP value is less than or equal to 1. The closer the GAP value of a DMU is to 1, the 
more efficient it is given the meta frontier technology. 
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Figure 2: Illustration of Meta Frontier Technology 
 
Figure 2 above displays 3 groups frontiers and the meta frontier with one input and 
one output. Given the input x and output y, the DMU A is not efficient relative to its group 
1 and the meta frontier. To obtain the technical efficiency of DMU A relative to the group 
frontier 1, TEA,1= OA/OA1 and the value obtained is less than 1.  Technical efficiency of 
DMU A relative to the meta frontier is equal to TE A, M= OA/OAM. GAP is the ratio of 
technical efficiency score relative to the meta frontier over technical efficiency score 
relative to the group frontier; TE A, M/TEA,1 which is less than equal to 1. Given that TEA,1 
is 0.7 it implies with constant set of inputs for DMU A and the group 1 technology, DMU 
A produces 70% of its maximum.  
If TE A, M is 0.4 it means that DMU A produces 40% of its maximum output using 
the constant set of inputs. Therefore, GAP is (0.4/0.7) = 0.57, thus DMU A maximum 
output is 57% of the output using the meta frontier technology. Given these efficiency 
scores obtained at group frontier and meta frontier respectively, DMU A is more efficient 
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within the group compared to the meta frontier. It is anticipated that access to the 
unrestricted and common technology will increase the efficiency of DMU A given the same 
set of inputs. Though, in this case, the maximum output DMU A could achieve given its 
technology is only 57% of the maximum output had DMU A have access to the unrestricted 
technology on the meta frontier. 
The meta frontier production allows comparison of DMU efficiencies within a 
group with other DMUs in different groups irrespective of the regional differences such as 
culture, natural resources among others and organizational structures. Additionally, meta 
frontier production highlights the efficiency performance of a given DMU, both at a group 
frontier and meta frontier level, by comparing the maximum percentage output the DMU 
produces, given the inputs and access to unrestricted technology. Through this, DMUs that 
have little access to the meta frontier can identify role models, and have technology transfer 
by learning what the role models do differently and then trying to incorporate these ideas 
in their programs. O’Donnell et al (2008) emphasize the importance of measuring GAP 
since it can be used to bring about performance improvement by designing and 
implementing programs that involve changes to production in each group. 
3. 5 Hypothesis Tests 
This thesis has four different hypothesis that are tested using the Kruskal-Wallis 
nonparametric test method at 1% significant level.  The main argument of this thesis is, 
microfinance institutions could reduce gender inequality by empowering women.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis test is efficiency scores are not related to the Gender 
Inequality Index against the alternative hypothesis that, efficiency scores and Gender 
Inequality Index are inversely related Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that 
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microfinance efficiency scores and Gender Inequality Index are inversely related such that 
as the efficiency score increases, the gender inequality index decreases, and vice versa. 
Therefore, microfinance institutions reduce the gender inequality by empowering women 
in the society. 
Secondly, this thesis tests the average efficiency score of DMUs across all regions, 
and hypothesizes that the average efficiency scores are the same across all regions. The 
alternative hypothesis is that average efficiency scores are not the same across all regions. 
This thesis also tests the distribution of GAP. The null hypothesis states that GAP 
distribution is the same across all regions and the alternative hypothesis is that GAP 
distribution is not the same across regions. 
Lastly, this thesis used the Spearman rank correlation to test whether the rankings 
of MFI efficiency obtained from the two models are correlated. The null hypothesis states 
that rankings of MFI efficiency in model 1 is not related to the rankings of MFI efficiency 
in model 2 against the alternative hypothesis that the rankings of MFI efficiency in model 
1 is related to the rankings of MFI efficiency in model 2. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Test of the Theory 
This chapter explains the empirical test of the theory used in this research. This 
chapter is arranged as follows: Section 4.1 presents data and variables where the readers 
will be able to understand where the data was obtained from and the time frame of the data, 
Additionally, the reader will be able to understand the selection criteria of the input and 
output variables used and what it captures in the analysis. Section 4.2 includes the 
descriptive analysis and outlier analysis of the data by each region and whole data set. This 
section brings out a visual summary of the data used in the research thus enabling 
comparison of variable distribution between regions. Section 4.3 presents the efficiency 
scores and hypothesis tests results found from running Meta frontier DEA analysis and 
different hypothesis. Lastly Section 4.4 summarizes the findings of the thesis in 
comparison to the hypothesis of the thesis.  
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4.1 Data and Variables 
MFIs are viewed either as a production unit or intermediation. Intermediation 
approach views financial institutions as intermediaries between borrowers and savers, 
whereas production views financial institutions as a production unit that uses standard 
inputs to produce financial services. In this thesis, production approach is applied to 
calculate the efficiency score of MFIs. These MFIs use various inputs such as technology, 
finances, and human capital to produce the financial services that are offered to the 
community and sustainability of daily operations. 
Data 
This thesis uses data obtained from the Mix Market Data Base over a period of 14 
years between 2002-2016. Analyzing this data frame highlights a clear pattern of the 
influence of microfinance institutions in the communities. Data from each year in any given 
microfinance institution is treated as a single Decision-Making Unit (DMU). This data 
covers various microfinance institutions from 17 countries from Latin America, 
Mediterranean and North Africa, East Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions.  
Input Variables 
Muneer and Kulshreshtha (2014) use assets, operational costs and number of loan 
officers as inputs to calculate efficiency scores of the MFIs. Using this basic conceptual 
framework for selecting variable with some modification to avoid double counting of 
variables, the inputs used in this thesis are operating assets, Administration and 
Depreciation & Amortization expense and number of loan officers. 
Operating assets includes the sum of cash and cash equivalents, net fixed asset and 
other assets. Cash & cash equivalents is defined as cash at hand or any other liquid form 
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of investment whose purpose is for short term use. Net fixed assets are any tangible assets 
owned by an organization and used for production or supply of goods and services i.e. 
office space, equipment. Net fixed assets are expected to be used for more than a year and 
take longer time to be converted into cash. Other asset includes accounts such as 
inventories, long-term investments, goodwill, tax assets, trade and other receivables among 
others. This variable captures the value of the microfinance institution both in the short and 
long-term aspects through the property it owns and resources available to enables operation 
in an efficient and sustainable way. 
Administration and Depreciation & Amortization expense variable is the difference 
between operating expense and personnel expense. Excluding personnel expense from the 
operating expense eliminates double counting of personnel since it is already represented 
by the number of loan officers as an input variable. This variable captures the expenses that 
are directly incurred through the provision of financial services to the clients. 
Loan officers are staff personnel responsible for recommending and approving loan 
request in the microfinance institution. This aspect captures the outreach level of a 
production unit to the community at large. Having enough number of loan officers that 
match to the population of the community will ensure that there is enough outreach and 
production unit will work more efficiently. 
  
 25 
 
Output Variables  
This thesis uses outputs that demonstrate the financial sustainability and social 
outreach of microfinance institutions. The basic conceptual framework for selecting the 
output variables have been drawn from Damme, Wijesiri, and Meoli (2016), Bezboruah 
and Pillai (2014), Lebovics, Hermes, and Hudon (2016) and Muneer and Kulshreshtha 
(2014).  
Muneer and Kulshreshtha (2014) use total number of active borrowers as an output 
to measure the breadth of the outreach of MFIs in India. Total number of active borrowers 
might constitute of both men and women borrowers within the MFI or only women 
borrowers. Based on this framework, both the number of male borrowers and number of 
women borrowers were used as two separate variables in this thesis. This is because 
incorporating number of men borrowers in the model, prevents biasness in the results 
obtained, through the assumption that the MFIs directs all their resources to only woman 
as their only clients. 
Damme, Wijesiri, and Meoli (2016) use number of women borrowers as one of its 
outputs to measure the governance and efficiency of microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka. 
Number of women borrowers captured the outreach of the MFIs. Additionally, Bezboruah 
and Pillai (2014) identified the effect of varying number of women borrowers participating 
in financial cooperatives and credit unions in developing countries. Therefore, to capture 
the depth and broadness of the social outreach objective of the microfinance institutions 
assessed in this thesis, number of women borrowers was utilized.  Number of women 
borrowers is the number represented by women in the total number of borrowers in the 
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microfinance institution. This variable is used to show the depth of microfinance 
institutions by evaluating the number of women enrolled in the program.   
  Lebovics, Hermes, and Hudon (2016) use gross loan portfolio as one of the outputs 
in evaluating if microfinance institutions’ financial and social efficiency are independent 
of each other in Vietnam. Also, Muneer and Kulshreshtha (2014) use gross loan portfolio 
as one of the outputs that captures all the outstanding loans such as current, delinquent and 
restructured loans. This thesis applies the above concept and uses net loan portfolio as 
output variable. Net loan portfolio is defined as all outstanding principals that are due from 
all client loans minus the impairment loss allowance. This variable captures the financial 
sustainability of the microfinance institution since it uses the principal from loans and 
repaid loans from clients to finance more loans to the people. 
Muneer and Kulshreshtha (2014) use average loan balance as output variable that 
captures the depth of outreach of Indian microfinance institutions. Based on this 
framework, Lebovics, Hermes, and Hudon (2016) further builds on this variable and 
construct a social output that captures both the breadth and depth of outreach. The authors 
first divide average loan balance per borrower by average annual income in MFIs operating 
areas to obtain breadth of outreach denoted as ki. The ki is first standardized before being 
subtracted from 1, to get the depth of the MFI outreach, denoted as pi. Lastly, the authors 
multiply the value pi by the number of active borrowers in the MFI to get a measure of the 
breadth and depth of outreach. By employing this similar concept, this thesis will only 
calculate the breadth of outreach of the MFIs to the low-income population by dividing 
average loan balance per borrower by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as an output 
variable and is measured in percentage. A higher percentage of the average loan balance 
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per per-capita GNI implies that the given MFI reaches out to more potential poor borrowers 
and therefore it is an output that can by expanded by the MFI.  
In this thesis, there are two models that have been applied in processing the data; 
model 1 has average loan outstanding per borrower per GNI capita while model 2 is without 
this variable. Results from the two models will be analyzed in this thesis. All inputs and 
outputs with monetary values are converted to constant 2005 dollars using the following 
formula:  
2005 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑥 =
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑥 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑃𝐼2005
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑥
 
 
4.2 Outlier and Descriptive Analysis 
Outlier Analysis 
The outlier analysis was performed for each region separately. The box plot was 
used to eliminate the extreme values that were found outside the +/- 3 interquartile range. 
One hundred and five observations were eliminated from the whole sample of 638 original 
observations.  This includes 19 observations from Latin America region, 16 observations 
from Mediterranean and North Africa region, 20 observations from East Asia, 30 
observations from South Asia region and 20 observations from Sub-Sahara Africa region. 
Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Tables 1-6 show the descriptive statistics of input-output variables in each region 
and the entire sample used to form the meta frontier. The coefficient of variation (C.V.) is 
used to compare the variation across variables.  A small coefficient of variation indicates 
that the data for a specific variable in consideration is closely distributed across 
observations in the sample and a larger value indicates that the data is highly scattered.  
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Analyzing the mean average values of variables across the regions, the operating 
assets ranges between 9.43 and 87.53 million 2005 constant USD. South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa regions have high operating assets value of 80.6 and 87.5 respectively, 
while MENA has the lowest value of 9.43 in comparison to the meta frontier average value 
of 48.69. The Administration, Depreciation and Amortization expense variable has a range 
between 2.56 and 9.80 and the meta frontier average of 5.03. The number of loan officer 
values are between 242 and 3004 across the regions. The number of loan officers in all 
regions, except one are below the meta frontier sample average of 1074. South Asia has 
exceptionally higher value of 3004.  
Net loan portfolio values fall between 45.59 and 158.75, with South Asia having 
the highest value and MENA the lowest one. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
regions have almost similar net loan portfolio values, 128.30 and 127.58 respectively. 
There are more women borrowers than men borrowers across all regions. Though South 
Asia has the highest number of women borrowers, approx. 1.3 million while its average 
men borrowers are only 44,327.  Latin America and MENA has lower values of difference 
between women and men borrowers approximately 10205 and 10814 respectively. The 
average loan per borrower/GNI capita varies from 15.42% in South Asia to 136.81% in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This implies that MFIs Sub-Saharan Africa are targeting more poor 
people in the communities.  
In the tables below, the C.V values obtained range from 30% to 554% implying 
that the distribution of data in this thesis is highly scattered. South Asia and MENA regions 
have a close distribution of Average loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita variable 
across observations because of their low C.V value of 31.17% and 43.78% respectively. 
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East Asia, South Asia, MENA and the meta frontier have highly scattered distribution of 
the number of male borrower variable in each region with the high C.V value of 554.77%, 
265.98%, 167.77% and 341.93% respectively. In general, MFIs in East Asia differ from 
the other regions because of high variations across variables, i.e. MFIs in this region appear 
to be differed widely in terms of their mix of inputs and outputs.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Latin America Region Data 
Latin America (N=121) 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 2005 
constant USD) 
43.62 86.56 0.12 468.24 198.45 
Admin, D&A expense (million 
2005 constant USD) 
5.10 7.33 0.04 31.51 143.79 
#Loan officers 
 
242 285 7 1141 117.36 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
127.58 232.76 0.29 1114.13 182.44 
#women borrowers 
 
30559 34974 361 141044 114.45 
#male borrowers 
 
20354 28397 0 122839 139.51 
Average loan balance/GNI per 
capita (%) 
125.48 249.00 4.91 2005.07 198.44 
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   Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Middle East and North Africa Region Data 
MENA (N=108) 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 
2005 constant USD) 
9.43 14.28 0.19 62.05 151.38 
 Admin, D&A expense 
(million 2005 constant USD) 
2.56 3.47 0.10 16.88 135.58 
#Loan officers 
 
314 407 19 2109 129.76 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
45.59 65.94 0.68 292.74 144.65 
#women borrowers 
 
45324 50417 2259 227920 111.24 
#male borrowers 
 
34510 57896 0 258369 167.77 
Average loan balance/GNI per 
capita (%) 
17.01 7.45 6.33 37.54 43.78 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for East Asia Region Data 
East Asia (N=86) 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 
2005 constant USD) 
18.15 38.83 0.54 270.97 213.91 
Admin, D&A expense 
(million 2005 constant USD) 
4.21 8.93 0.17 78.72 212.29 
#Loan officers 555 619 50 2989 111.65 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
116.97 463.96 1.61 4262.00 396.65 
#women borrowers 175356 488808 6049 4440150 278.75 
#male borrowers 47603 264084 0 2459850 554.77 
Average loan balance/GNI per 
capita (%) 
82.59 103.21 3.97 535.41 124.97 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for South Asia Region Data 
South Asia (N=143) 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 
2005 constant USD) 
80.64 181.99 0.37 1156.95 225.70 
Admin, D&A expense 
(million 2005 constant 
USD) 
4.81 7.47 0.14 39.08 155.12 
#Loan officers 
 
3004 3910 94 15331 130.15 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
158.75 235.56 1.48 1140.51 148.39 
#women borrowers 
 
1290361 1817038 15987 7037766 140.82 
#male borrowers 
 
44327 117903 0 613872 265.98 
Average loan balance/GNI 
per capita (%) 
15.42 4.81 5.20 40.41 31.17 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa Region Data 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=75) 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 
2005 constant USD) 
87.53 188.90 0.94 922.94 215.82 
Admin, D&A expense 
(million 2005 constant 
USD) 
9.80 17.26 0.27 85.14 176.10 
#Loan officers 
 
426 472 23 1847 110.81 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
128.30 271.46 3.34 1474.31 211.59 
#women borrowers 70229 101974 2474 413040 145.20 
#male borrowers 51003 99437 0 497200 194.96 
Average loan balance/GNI 
per capita (%) 
136.81 84.05 14.15 340.88 61.43 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Meta Frontier Data 
Meta Frontier Data (N=533) 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum CV (%) 
Inputs:      
Operating Assets (million 
2005 constant USD) 
48.69 129.36 0.12 1156.95 265.66 
 Admin, D&A expense 
(million 2005 constant 
USD) 
5.03 9.39 0.04 85.14 186.84 
#Loan officers 
 
1074 2367 7 15331 220.39 
Outputs:      
Net Loan Portfolio (million 
2005 constant USD) 
117.72 272.21 0.29 4262.00 231.24 
#women borrowers 
 
400492 1102192 361 7037766 275.21 
#male borrowers 
 
38364 131176 0 2459850 341.93 
Average loan balance/GNI 
per capita (%) 
68.65 139.32 3.97 2005.07 202.95 
 
4.3 Efficiency and Hypothesis Tests Results 
4.3.1 Meta Frontier Efficiency Scores 
There are two models that have been used in the calculation of efficiency scores of MFIs 
in this thesis: model 1 has average loan outstanding per borrower per GNI per capita, while 
model 2 does not have this variable. The results obtained from both models are presented 
in table 7. 
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Table 7: Average Efficiency Scores for Meta Frontier, Group Frontier and 
GAP  
Region 
 Model 1   Model 2   
N Average 
vrsteM 
Average 
vrsteG 
Average 
GAP 
Average 
vrsteM 
Average 
vrsteG 
Average 
GAP 
Latin America 
 
121 
0.60 0.89 0.67 0.49 0.84 0.57 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
108 
0.47 0.85 0.55 0.43 0.80 0.54 
East Asia 
 
86 
0.65 0.83 0.77 0.52 0.73 0.72 
South Asia 
 
143 
0.69 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.73 0.93 
Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
75 
0.59 0.95 0.62 0.38 0.89 0.42 
Meta Frontier 
 
533 
0.60   0.52   
 
This thesis will first discuss the results from the meta frontier with reference to 
table 7 above. The average efficiency values on the meta frontier or by region for model 
1is higher than those in model 2. This is because model one has an additional output 
variable (average loan balance per borrower per GNI per capita), which increases its 
efficiency score.  
The meta frontier average efficiency score for model 1 (0.60) is higher than that of 
model 2 (0.52). Additionally, the average vrsteM value for regions in model 1 are higher 
than those in model 2. In model 1, South Asia has the highest value whereas MENA has 
the lowest value of vrsteM, whereas in model two, South Asia has the highest score (0.68) 
and Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest score (0.38). For details on the efficiency score of 
each model, see Appendices I and II.  
The thesis will now discuss the efficient peers and the characteristics of the frequent 
role models on the meta frontier. Table 8 below provides information on the number of 
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efficient firms on the meta frontier and the number of efficient firms on the group frontier 
by region.   
Table 8: Efficient Peers on Meta Frontier and Group Frontier  
 Model 1  
Region  
#Efficient firms on 
the meta frontier 
#Efficient firms on 
the group frontier  
Latin America(N=121) 13 50 
MENA(N=108) 1 34 
East Asia(N=86) 13 36 
South Asia(N=143) 23 42 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=75) 6 39 
Meta frontier 56  
 Model 2  
Latin America(N=121) 10 39 
MENA(N=108) 1 34 
East Asia(N=86) 5 18 
South Asia(N=143) 23 33 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=75) 1 29 
Meta frontier 40  
 
An efficient peer operates on the meta frontier, has an average efficiency score of 
1, thus produces a maximum output of 100% given the set of inputs and the unrestricted 
technology. As shown in table 8 above, model 1 has 56 efficient peers on the meta frontier 
(vrsteM); South Asia has concentrated number of efficient peers (23) in comparison to 
other regions. Latin America and East Asia have 13 efficient peers and lastly MENA and 
Sub-Saharan Africa has 1 and 6 efficient peers respectively. Model 2 has 40 efficient peers 
on the meta frontier; South Asia is highly concentrated with efficient peers in comparison 
to other regions. It has 23 efficient peers, Latin America has 10, East Asia had 5, MENA 
and Sub-Saharan Africa have 1 efficient peer. Therefore, DMUs in South Asia region have 
more access to the meta frontier technology whereas those in Sub-Saharan Africa have the 
least access. 
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Each inefficient DMU has one or more other peer DMUs that it can model after, if 
it wants to improve its performance through technology transfer. The number of times a 
certain DMU appears as a role model for other DMUs is defined as peer count. DMUs with 
high peer count are considered ideal and their model replicable for improvement of results. 
Starting with model 1, the frequent peers for the meta frontier are mainly located in Latin 
America, East Asia and South Asia regions. MENA has 1 frequent peer and Sub-Saharan 
Africa has 4. Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), firm 302, located in East Asia and 
has a peer count of 396. In South Asia, Spandana, firm 442, has the highest number of peer 
count of 127 and Banco Fassil, firm 12, in Latin America has a peer count of 110. Inmaa, 
firm 194, is the only firm with a frequent peer in MENA with peer count of 24. Now on to 
model 2, Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), firm 302, has the peer count of 428 
and Spandana, firm 442 has a peer count of 196. CDS Cameroun, firm 488, the only 
efficient DMU in the Sub-Saharan Africa region in model 2. Overall, Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (VBSP), firm 302, has the highest number of peer counts in both models, 
indicating that this firm has been widely used as role models for other firms in both models 
and is considered an ideal DMU. For more details about frequent peers and regions located 
in, see Appendices III and IV 
Spandana microfinance institution located in Hyderabad, India. Banerjee et al. 
(2015) outline that Spandana is a profit organization mainly targets women between age of 
18-59 with proper identification and residential proof and does not require borrowers to 
have any microentrepreneurial idea/activity. The authors further explain that the 
organization has a year loan term with a weekly repayment method and 24% interest rate. 
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These are group loans given to groups of roughly 6-10 people and repayment relies on 
groups. The average loan size as a proportion of income is approximately 22%.  
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) is a non-profit organization established 
as a government policy to reduce poverty and increase access to affordable and sustainable 
financial services to the underserved across the country. The funds for this program come 
from government budgeting, state budgeting, auctioning of VBSP bonds among others. 
This program mainly targets people who cannot access commercial banks in remotes areas 
of the country. VBSP encourages borrowers to take loan for business purposes, home 
improvement, and increase access of safe water and electricity (Devex, n.d.). VBSP also 
provides educational scholarships to students from low-income families, access to finance 
for households for labor migrants and businesses that provide jobs for disadvantaged ethnic 
minority and former drug addicts.   
As explained in Mix Market brochure (2016), VBSP partnered with the local 
organization such as Women Union, Farmer Union, Veteran Union and Youth union that 
assisted in lending process by communicating loan policies and programs being offered. 
Furthermore, these organization assist in identifying poor people in the local communities 
because of the knowledge on the people living in the area.  The article further mentions 
that the process of selecting eligible households involved a committee made of local 
organizations, local authorities and village elders, which was a better way of identifying a 
good candidate for the loan: one who needs it and can repay it back, thus efficient loan 
procedures and management. The brochure also highlights that VBSP publicly displayed a 
list of active borrowers and non-performing loans, which encourage high credibility among 
borrowers in the community. Lastly, the brochure emphasizes that VBSP had set dates and 
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points that they will be carrying out financial services within the community to ensure 
consistency, convenience and easy of transactions. 
Both Spandana and VBSP focus on the wellness of the community through 
microlending. While Spandana focuses on women, VBSP focuses on the poverty levels 
across genders. VBSP stands out as a government-sponsored microfinance institution 
initiated to implement government programs that involves the local people in making 
decisions. For instance, eligibility of the candidate depends on the need of aid and 
reputation based on the knowledge of the local committee.  
4.3.2 Efficiency Score for DMUs by Region 
This section will focus on the group frontier efficiency scores of MFIs with 
reference to table 7. The average vrsteG in model 1 are higher than in model 2. In model 
1, the average vrsteG ranges from 0.83 to 0.95, Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest value 
and East Asia and South Asia with the lowest at 0.83. This range relatively implies that the 
MFIs in the regions produce at least between 83% and 95% of the maximum output given 
the constant set of inputs and technology in each respective region.  In model 2, the average 
vrsteG ranges from 0.73 to 0.89, with Sub-Saharan Africa having the highest score. Thus, 
the MFIs produces between 73% and 89% of the maximum output given the technology 
and the inputs. With reference to table 8, Latin America region has the highest number of 
efficient peer on the group frontier in both model 1 and 2. MENA has the least number of 
efficient peers (34) in model 1 and East Asia (18) in model 2. For further details on group 
frontier efficiency scores of DMUs by region, see Appendices V-IX. 
Based on the information in table 7, MFIs have higher average efficiency scores on 
group frontier than on the meta frontier. For instance, the average efficiency score of Sub-
Saharan Africa on group frontier is 0.95 and 0.59 on the meta frontier in model 1.  This 
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thesis will focus on exploring the characteristics that make Credit Du Sahel (CDS) located 
in Cameroon (Sub-Saharan Africa region), which is efficient on the group frontier but 
inefficient on the meta frontier and VBSP is one of its efficient peers in the meta frontier 
model. CDS was established in 1997 as a corporative bank then later added the 
microfinance institution aspect in 2004 as explained by Andre (2008). The author 
mentioned that CDS has various stages of authentication before a potential client is given 
a loan.  The author further outlined the stages as follows: first, getting the application file, 
where the client should have an Identification card, pay slips from the last three months, 
and a duty certificate. Second, background details on the client is done based on morality, 
account movements and commission drawn on the account. Third, credit committee 
decides. Fourth, collateral or any material to show guarantee of payment is given. Fifth, 
terms and conditions on the loan are defined and lastly the credit agreement signed. After 
all these stages, the client can now access the loan. The MFI has further tightened its 
operations to minimize any debt by giving a production based loan guarantee (Business in 
Cameroon, 2018). This article explains that MFI takes charge of the crops grown by 
farmers, then 2-3 months after harvesting they sell the produce. The profit obtained is then 
used to cover the loan plus the interest and the rest is directed to the farmers. CDS ensures 
financial sustainability by taking charge of production and selling of the crops. CDS is also 
much stricter when it comes to requirements for a loan compared to its role model: VBSP.  
VBSP entirely depends on local committee to assist in the selection of eligible clients for 
a loan entirely based on need and character of the client. VBSP is a government run 
initiative whereas CDS is a for profit cooperative as well as a microfinance institution. 
Therefore, for CDS to improve its efficiency on the meta frontier, it can alter its potential 
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client identification process to need based or reducing the requirements. Additionally, CDS 
can involve more people from the local communities to assist in determining if a client is 
eligible for loan or not. 
4.3.3 Evaluation of GAP Values by Region 
This thesis will now discuss the average GAP value with reference to table 7. GAP 
is the ratio of meta frontier efficiency scores to group frontier efficiency scores. GAP value 
shows the maximum output level given the group frontier technology and the DMU’s input 
level as a percentage of the maximum output level possible had the DMU have access to 
the meta frontier technology. Therefore, the closer the GAP value is to 1, the higher the 
DMU’s ability to access the meta frontier technology. Average GAP values in model 1 are 
greater than those of model 2.  South Asia region has the highest average GAP values of 
0.83 and 0.93 in model 1 and 2 respectively. This implies that DMUs from this region 
produce 83% and 93% of maximum potential output, given the set on inputs and meta 
frontier technology in respective models, after eliminating inefficiency relative to the group 
frontier. Sub-Saharan Africa has an average GAP value of 0.62 and 0.42 in models 1 and 
2 respectively. Despite the Sub-Saharan Africa region being highly efficient in the group 
frontier, the MFIs in this region have very limit access to the meta frontier technology, 
compared to MFIs in other regions.  For DMUs in Sub-Saharan Africa to improve their 
efficiency performance on the meta frontier, they must experience technology transfer 
through role modelling.  
Based on table 8, South Asia contributes the most to the construction of the meta 
frontier with 23 out of 56 meta frontier efficient MFIs. East Asia and Latin America have 
the second largest share on the meta frontier. Only one MFI in MENA region has access to 
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the meta frontier technology. In model 2, MFIs from South Asia make up 57.5% of the 
meta frontier while MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa each contribute to only 2.5% with one 
out of 40 meta frontier efficient MFIs come from each region. It is evident that MFIs in 
South Asia region have more access to the unrestricted technology. 
4.3.4 Hypothesis Testing Results for Efficiency Scores 
This thesis carries out several hypothesis tests as outlined in Section 3.5. One of the 
hypothesis is that the average efficiency scores are the same across all regions, against the 
alternative hypothesis that average efficiency scores are not the same across all regions. 
This thesis uses Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test to test whether the meta-frontier 
efficiency scores, on average, differ across regions.  The Chi-square statistic for model 1 
is 68.7 and for model 2 is 113.4.  Both are statistically significance at the 1%, indicating 
that average meta-frontier efficiency scores differ across regions.  In other words, MFIs in 
each region are not equally efficient.   For details of the tests, see Appendices X and XI. 
This thesis also tests the distributions of GAP. The null hypothesis states that GAP 
distribution is the same across all regions and the alternative hypothesis is that GAP 
distribution is not the same across regions. Based on the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric 
test, the Chi-square statistics for models 1 and 2 are 137.0 and 283.9, respectively.  These 
statistics are statistically significance at the 1% level. Therefore, this thesis finds evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of GAP is same across regions.  For details 
of the test, see Appendices XII and XIII. 
This thesis further analyzes the distribution of GAP across regions using boxplots. 
Figures 3 and 4 below show the distribution of GAP across region for model 1 and 2 
respectively. In the figures below, letters A, B, C, D and E represents each distinct region 
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used in the data as follows: A= Latin America, B= Middle East and North Africa, C= East 
Asia, D= South Asia and E= Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of GAP for Model 1 
 
 
In figure 3, MENA (B) region and South Asia (D) have outliers, though South Asia 
has outlier in the lower quartile of the boxplot. South Asia and East Asia regions largely 
contribute toward the meta frontier. This is because the mean scores of GAP is relatively 
high. On the other hand, MENA (B) and Sub-Saharan Africa (E) have relatively lower 
means scores and have a lower contribution to the meta frontier as shown in table 8. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of GAP for Model 2 
 
 
In figure 4 above, Latin America (A), MENA (B), Sub-Saharan Africa (E) and 
South Asia (D) have outliers though the South Asia has outliers below the lower quartile 
of the boxplot.  It is also clear that South Asia heavily contributes to the meta frontier since 
the mean scores are relatively high. MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa DMUs on the other 
hand do not largely contribute to the meta frontier as shown in table 8. 
4.3.5 Ranking of Efficiency Score in Models 1 and 2 
This thesis uses the Spearman rank correlation to test whether the rankings of MFI 
efficiency obtained from the two models are correlated. The null hypothesis states that 
rankings of MFI efficiency in model 1 is not related to the rankings of MFI efficiency in 
model 2 against the alternative hypothesis that the rankings of MFI efficiency in model 1 
is related to the rankings of MFI efficiency in model 2. 
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Table 9 below shows the results obtained from ranking the efficiency scores in 
model 1 and 2. The correlation coefficient values range between 0.76 and 0.96 and are 
significant at 1% level.  MENA has the highest value and East Asia the lowest value. The 
correlation values obtained imply that there is a high and positive correlation between the 
ranking in model 1 and 2. In other words, MFIs in the sample receive similar ranks, 
regardless of the model specification.  Hence, our results are robust across models.   
Table 9: Spearman’ s Correlation Rank for Models 1 and 2 
Region 
Group:  
Mean 
TEVRS1 
Group:  
Mean 
TEVRS2 
Correlatio
n 
coefficient 
P value 
Latin America(N=121) 0.89 0.84 0.88 <.0001 
MENA(N=108) 0.85 0.80 0.96 <.0001 
East Asia(N=86) 0.83 0.73 0.76 <.0001 
South Asia(N=143) 0.83 0.73 0.80 <.0001 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(N=75) 
0.95 0.89 0.82 <.0001 
 
4.3.6 Correlation between Efficiency Scores and Gender Inequality Index 
In this section, we test the null hypothesis test that efficiency scores are not linearly 
related to the Gender Inequality Index against the alternative hypothesis that, efficiency 
scores and Gender Inequality Index are linearly related. This thesis uses correlation 
coefficient as a measure of linear association between the two variables. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis indicates that microfinance efficiency scores and Gender Inequality Index are 
related. The sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship.  
This thesis expects that the correlation coefficient has negative sign, meaning that the 
efficiency scores are inversely related to the Gender Inequality Index; as the efficiency 
score increases, the gender inequality index decreases, and vice versa.  
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Gender Inequality Index (GII) is used to measure the disparity between male and 
female in any given community. The GII ranges from 0 to 1. A lower value of GII indicates 
less inequality present and higher value shows more inequality present. The GII data was 
available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010-2015. Due to missing data on the years between 
2002-2016, this thesis used 2005, 2010 and 2015. Additionally, the GII values for 
Madagascar were not reported, thus the 6 MFIs from the country were excluded from the 
analysis, reducing the number of DMUs in Sub-Saharan Africa to 69 that were used to test 
this hypothesis. Therefore, only 16 countries were used in the analysis. Table 10 below, 
shows the GII values of countries in the data across regions. Cameroon has the highest GII 
value of 0.661 in 2005 and Vietnam has the lowest of 0.317 in 2005. 
Table 10: Gender Inequality Index for Countries in the Data 
Country 2005 2010 2015 
 Bangladesh 0.591 0.559 0.52 
 Bolivia  0.559 0.503 0.446 
 Brazil 0.469 0.454 0.414 
 Cambodia 0.561 0.492 0.479 
 Cameroon 0.661 0.623 0.568 
 Ethiopia 0.611 0.576 0.499 
 Guatemala 0.57 0.54 0.494 
 Honduras 0.515 0.513 0.461 
 India 0.619 0.591 0.53 
 Jordan 0.557 0.488 0.478 
 Kenya 0.654 0.616 0.565 
 Lebanon - 0.404 0.381 
 Morocco 0.58 0.563 0.494 
 Pakistan 0.595 0.57 0.546 
 Senegal 0.629 0.575 0.521 
 Viet Nam 0.317 0.324 0.337 
Source: United Nations Human Development database 
The efficiency score of DMUs in regions were first classified by country of 
operation then average values of efficiency scores obtained between years 2002-2005, 
2006-2010 and 2011-2016. These average efficiency scores calculated between 2002-
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2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2016 were then correlated with the 2005, 2010 and 2015 GII 
values to obtain coefficient values as shown in table 11 below. 
Table 11: Correlation Results Between GII and Average Efficiency Scores 
Model 1 
Region Correlation 
coefficient  
P value 
Latin America(N=121) 0.29 0.39 
MENA(N=108) 0.45 0.23 
East Asia(N=86) -0.67 0.14 
South Asia(N=143) 0.18 0.64 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=69) -0.16 0.7 
Model 2 
Region Correlation 
coefficient 
P value 
Latin America(N=121) -0.09 0.8 
MENA(N=108) 0.3 0.43 
East Asia(N=86) -0.7 0.12 
South Asia(N=143) 0.13 0.72 
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=69) -0.25 0.56 
 
From table 11, the correlation coefficient values range from -0.70 to 0.45.  Within 
this range, the negative values show a negative correlation between the efficiency scores 
and GII variables, such that as efficiency scores of MFIs increase, the GII decreases and 
vice versa. East Asia region has a negative correlation coefficient of -0.67 in model 1 and 
-0.70 in model 2, which are the closest value to a perfect negative correlation of -1. This 
implies that East Asia in comparison to other regions has a stronger negative correlation 
between the GII and efficiency score variable. 
On the other hand, the positive correlation coefficient value implies that both the 
efficiency score increases and GII increase simultaneously. MENA region, in comparison 
to other regions, has the highest positive value of correlation coefficients of 0.45 and 0.30 
in models 1 and 2 respectively.  
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The p values of the correlation coefficient values obtained range between 0.12 and 
0.80. The p values are greater than 0.01, therefore this thesis does not find evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that efficiency scores are not linearly related to the Gender 
Inequality Index.  
4.4 Results Conclusion 
In summary, the results reflect that the average efficiency scores and the 
distribution of GAP vary across regions on the meta frontier. Also, the efficiency ranking 
in model 1 and 2 are highly related which confirms the robustness of the results obtained 
in the research.  Regarding the correlation between GII and efficiency scores, the results 
obtained were not significant at 1% level since the p values were greater than 0.01. This 
thesis does not find enough supporting evidence to reject the null hypothesis that efficiency 
scores are not linearly related to the Gender Inequality Index. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The primary focus of this thesis is to evaluate how the efficiency of a microfinance 
institutions affects Gender Inequality Index. The null hypothesis test is efficiency scores 
are not related to the Gender Inequality Index against the alternative hypothesis that, 
efficiency scores and Gender Inequality Index are inversely related. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis indicates that microfinance efficiency scores and Gender Inequality Index are 
inversely related; that is, as the efficiency score increases, the gender inequality index 
decreases, and vice versa. Consequently, microfinance institutions reduce the gender 
inequality by empowering women in the society. 
This thesis did not find sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Though an 
in-depth analysis of the frequent peers in the meta frontier, such as Spandana and Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), showed that there is potential for microfinance 
institutions to reduce poverty levels and empower women in the society.  Therefore, this 
thesis serves as an additional evidence that can be used by policy makers to better the 
structure and efficiency of microfinance institutions in their communities.  
The first policy recommendation might focus on designing programs that provide 
vocational training such as tailoring, hairdressing, finance classes among others.  This is 
because women start to actively contribute towards the overall GDP of a country by being 
involved in business activities unlike when they are working in the household and 
contributing more to the wellness of the family. Therefore, equipping women with better 
skills on how to run a successful business will not only provide financial freedom but also 
empower women and sustainable development of the country.  
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The second policy recommendation might include designing and implementing 
policies that would encourage governments to take part in MFIs financing and 
management. Governments can finance MFI projects in various ways such as selling 
bonds, incorporating annual budgeting and subsidizing interest rates on loans. By 
incorporating MFIs spending into the national budget, the government sets aside a fraction 
of the country’s revenue in a fiscal year, specifically designed for expanding, subsidizing 
interest rates on loans and ensuring financial sustainability within the MFI sector. VBSP 
clearly demonstrated a government-led initiative that has successfully being implemented 
and has had a positive impact on the people. Vietnam has maintained a relatively low GII 
value of around 0.335 as of 2015. Access to finance plays a significant role in improving 
standards of living and poverty levels. According to Mix Market brochure (2016), VBSP 
brought about positive results in reducing the overall poverty rate from 7.8% in 2013 to 
4.5% in 2015. For instance, the VBSP loan is encouraged for various reasons such as 
education, housing, business, water and electricity. Therefore, the loans aim at the overall 
wellness of the community. 
One of the limitations of this thesis is that, it does not clearly capture the effects of 
a country’s already established infrastructure on the efficiency of microfinance institutions. 
Microfinance institutions in countries with already developed financial infrastructure may 
not reflect significant results on its effect in the community. Additionally, some countries 
have low Gender Inequality Index value therefore MFIs might be more efficient in these 
places because of low cost of operating assets and Administration and Depreciation & 
Amortization expense. Therefore, under these circumstances MFIs might not necessarily 
cause women empowerment even if they are efficient. 
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Another limitation of this thesis is that Gender Inequality Index is affected with 
other factors such as labor market participation, access to education, and reproductive 
health other than empowerment.  For GII value to change these factors need to shift almost 
simultaneously to bring about reduction in gender inequality. Controlling for the above 
limitations, this research can be furthered to evaluate effects of microfinance institutions 
on women empowerment in the communities. 
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   Appendices 
Appendix I 
Efficiency Scores for Meta Frontier, Group Frontier and the GAP: Model 1 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
1 1 1 1.00 LA  26 0.591 1 0.59 LA 
2 1 1 1.00 LA  27 0.59 1 0.59 LA 
3 1 1 1.00 LA  28 0.581 0.99 0.59 LA 
4 0.994 1 0.99 LA  29 0.561 0.97 0.58 LA 
5 0.906 0.982 0.92 LA  30 0.638 0.985 0.65 LA 
6 0.772 1 0.77 LA  31 0.661 1 0.66 LA 
7 1 1 1.00 LA  32 0.646 1 0.65 LA 
8 0.777 1 0.78 LA  33 0.62 1 0.62 LA 
9 0.693 1 0.69 LA  34 0.631 1 0.63 LA 
10 0.437 0.688 0.64 LA  35 0.654 1 0.65 LA 
11 0.5 0.57 0.88 LA  36 0.698 1 0.70 LA 
12 1 1 1.00 LA  37 0.601 0.815 0.74 LA 
13 0.721 0.78 0.92 LA  38 0.641 0.993 0.65 LA 
14 0.57 0.666 0.86 LA  39 0.63 1 0.63 LA 
15 0.553 0.676 0.82 LA  40 0.506 0.7 0.72 LA 
16 0.442 0.544 0.81 LA  41 0.428 0.679 0.63 LA 
17 0.431 0.545 0.79 LA  42 0.484 0.874 0.55 LA 
18 0.413 0.618 0.67 LA  43 0.448 0.753 0.59 LA 
19 0.74 0.955 0.77 LA  44 0.366 0.627 0.58 LA 
20 1 1 1.00 LA  45 0.315 0.604 0.52 LA 
21 1 1 1.00 LA  46 0.257 0.636 0.40 LA 
22 0.639 0.848 0.75 LA  47 0.763 0.992 0.77 LA 
23 0.59 0.969 0.61 LA  48 0.468 0.884 0.53 LA 
24 0.496 0.909 0.55 LA  49 0.36 0.861 0.42 LA 
25 0.498 0.931 0.53 LA  50 0.345 0.88 0.39 LA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
51 0.349 0.904 0.39 LA  76 0.471 0.925 0.51 LA 
52 0.369 0.886 0.42 LA  77 0.564 1 0.56 LA 
53 0.372 0.897 0.41 LA  78 0.577 1 0.58 LA 
54 0.423 0.816 0.52 LA  79 0.458 1 0.46 LA 
55 0.459 0.765 0.60 LA  80 0.51 1 0.51 LA 
56 0.599 0.891 0.67 LA  81 0.541 1 0.54 LA 
57 0.553 0.902 0.61 LA  82 0.536 0.987 0.54 LA 
58 0.632 0.961 0.66 LA  83 0.66 1 0.66 LA 
59 0.634 1 0.63 LA  84 0.578 0.957 0.60 LA 
60 1 1 1.00 LA  85 0.514 0.897 0.57 LA 
61 0.604 0.604 1.00 LA  86 0.495 0.984 0.50 LA 
62 0.775 1 0.78 LA  87 0.658 0.933 0.71 LA 
63 0.423 0.711 0.59 LA  88 0.753 1 0.75 LA 
64 1 1 1.00 LA  89 0.871 1 0.87 LA 
65 0.447 1 0.45 LA  90 0.51 0.816 0.63 LA 
66 0.629 1 0.63 LA  91 0.495 0.813 0.61 LA 
67 0.476 0.948 0.50 LA  92 0.509 0.868 0.59 LA 
68 0.422 0.899 0.47 LA  93 0.61 1 0.61 LA 
69 0.407 0.958 0.42 LA  94 0.54 1 0.54 LA 
70 0.376 0.944 0.40 LA  95 0.579 0.736 0.79 LA 
71 0.359 0.883 0.41 LA  96 1 1 1.00 LA 
72 0.369 0.901 0.41 LA  97 1 1 1.00 LA 
73 0.417 0.945 0.44 LA  98 0.907 1 0.91 LA 
74 0.477 1 0.48 LA  99 0.959 1 0.96 LA 
75 0.469 1 0.47 LA  100 0.344 0.482 0.71 LA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
101 0.313 0.491 0.64 LA  126 0.376 0.599 0.63 MENA 
102 0.345 0.523 0.66 LA  127 0.397 0.552 0.72 MENA 
103 0.33 0.508 0.65 LA  128 0.533 0.836 0.64 MENA 
104 0.362 0.479 0.76 LA  129 0.253 0.45 0.56 MENA 
105 0.616 1 0.62 LA  130 0.325 0.551 0.59 MENA 
106 0.581 1 0.58 LA  131 0.338 0.546 0.62 MENA 
107 0.416 0.723 0.58 LA  132 0.357 0.61 0.59 MENA 
108 0.451 0.767 0.59 LA  133 0.895 1 0.90 MENA 
109 0.676 0.761 0.89 LA  134 0.861 1 0.86 MENA 
110 1 1 1.00 LA  135 0.635 1 0.64 MENA 
111 1 1 1.00 LA  136 0.477 1 0.48 MENA 
112 0.776 0.979 0.79 LA  137 0.646 1 0.65 MENA 
113 0.669 0.853 0.78 LA  138 0.545 0.945 0.58 MENA 
114 0.586 0.921 0.64 LA  139 0.65 1 0.65 MENA 
115 0.704 0.973 0.72 LA  140 0.584 0.964 0.61 MENA 
116 0.686 1 0.69 LA  141 0.587 0.977 0.60 MENA 
117 0.689 1 0.69 LA  142 0.654 1 0.65 MENA 
118 0.53 1 0.53 LA  143 0.665 1 0.67 MENA 
119 0.482 1 0.48 LA  144 0.283 0.452 0.63 MENA 
120 0.332 0.692 0.48 LA  145 0.309 0.467 0.66 MENA 
121 0.334 0.648 0.52 LA  146 0.364 0.584 0.62 MENA 
122 0.647 1 0.65 MENA  147 0.42 0.75 0.56 MENA 
123 0.532 0.874 0.61 MENA  148 0.494 0.806 0.61 MENA 
124 0.567 0.892 0.64 MENA  149 0.522 0.901 0.58 MENA 
125 0.444 0.695 0.64 MENA  150 0.45 0.817 0.55 MENA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
151 0.435 0.852 0.51 MENA  176 0.423 1 0.42 MENA 
152 0.466 0.914 0.51 MENA  177 0.331 0.903 0.37 MENA 
153 0.441 0.884 0.50 MENA  178 0.259 0.94 0.28 MENA 
154 0.402 0.918 0.44 MENA  179 0.252 0.924 0.27 MENA 
155 0.499 1 0.50 MENA  180 0.287 0.874 0.33 MENA 
156 0.406 1 0.41 MENA  181 0.357 0.741 0.48 MENA 
157 0.328 0.759 0.43 MENA  182 0.499 0.976 0.51 MENA 
158 0.316 0.711 0.44 MENA  183 0.599 1 0.60 MENA 
159 0.538 1 0.54 MENA  184 0.698 1 0.70 MENA 
160 0.318 0.63 0.50 MENA  185 0.525 0.88 0.60 MENA 
161 0.179 0.412 0.43 MENA  186 0.412 0.71 0.58 MENA 
162 0.312 0.592 0.53 MENA  187 0.396 0.774 0.51 MENA 
163 0.326 0.612 0.53 MENA  188 0.33 0.727 0.45 MENA 
164 0.266 0.538 0.49 MENA  189 0.306 0.714 0.43 MENA 
165 0.235 0.501 0.47 MENA  190 0.408 0.932 0.44 MENA 
166 0.247 0.499 0.49 MENA  191 0.276 0.834 0.33 MENA 
167 0.259 0.455 0.57 MENA  192 0.286 0.784 0.36 MENA 
168 0.237 0.486 0.49 MENA  193 0.786 1 0.79 MENA 
169 0.585 0.825 0.71 MENA  194 1 1 1.00 MENA 
170 0.318 0.874 0.36 MENA  195 0.596 0.876 0.68 MENA 
171 0.265 0.869 0.30 MENA  196 0.445 0.704 0.63 MENA 
172 0.841 1 0.84 MENA  197 0.693 0.958 0.72 MENA 
173 0.569 1 0.57 MENA  198 0.455 0.875 0.52 MENA 
174 0.47 0.884 0.53 MENA  199 0.712 0.854 0.83 MENA 
175 0.368 0.918 0.40 MENA  200 0.434 0.889 0.49 MENA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
201 0.466 0.751 0.62 MENA  226 0.579 1 0.58 MENA 
202 0.401 0.687 0.58 MENA  227 0.486 0.997 0.49 MENA 
203 0.438 0.751 0.58 MENA  228 0.372 0.921 0.40 MENA 
204 0.366 0.599 0.61 MENA  229 0.246 0.915 0.27 MENA 
205 0.408 0.956 0.43 MENA  230 0.771 0.844 0.91 EA 
206 0.444 0.951 0.47 MENA  231 0.839 0.939 0.89 EA 
207 0.494 1 0.49 MENA  232 0.721 0.921 0.78 EA 
208 0.575 1 0.58 MENA  233 0.656 0.825 0.80 EA 
209 0.623 1 0.62 MENA  234 0.735 1 0.74 EA 
210 0.565 0.98 0.58 MENA  235 0.588 0.993 0.59 EA 
211 0.522 1 0.52 MENA  236 0.518 0.778 0.67 EA 
212 0.513 1 0.51 MENA  237 0.399 0.729 0.55 EA 
213 0.503 1 0.50 MENA  238 0.339 0.605 0.56 EA 
214 0.428 1 0.43 MENA  239 0.333 0.525 0.63 EA 
215 0.391 0.945 0.41 MENA  240 0.394 0.527 0.75 EA 
216 0.415 1 0.42 MENA  241 0.471 0.523 0.90 EA 
217 0.403 1 0.40 MENA  242 0.526 0.547 0.96 EA 
218 0.573 1 0.57 MENA  243 0.706 0.748 0.94 EA 
219 0.439 0.951 0.46 MENA  244 0.348 0.6 0.58 EA 
220 0.598 1 0.60 MENA  245 0.293 0.636 0.46 EA 
221 0.596 1 0.60 MENA  246 0.28 0.763 0.37 EA 
222 0.379 0.987 0.38 MENA  247 0.297 0.863 0.34 EA 
223 0.454 1 0.45 MENA  248 0.383 1 0.38 EA 
224 0.869 1 0.87 MENA  249 0.315 0.863 0.37 EA 
225 0.561 0.915 0.61 MENA  250 0.385 0.96 0.40 EA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
251 0.37 1 0.37 EA  276 0.982 1 0.98 EA 
252 0.346 0.877 0.39 EA  277 1 1 1.00 EA 
253 0.394 0.956 0.41 EA  278 1 1 1.00 EA 
254 0.371 0.973 0.38 EA  279 0.628 0.66 0.95 EA 
255 1 1 1.00 EA  280 0.784 0.797 0.98 EA 
256 0.862 1 0.86 EA  281 0.733 0.746 0.98 EA 
257 0.803 0.932 0.86 EA  282 1 1 1.00 EA 
258 0.588 0.636 0.92 EA  283 1 1 1.00 EA 
259 0.825 0.827 1.00 EA  284 0.997 1 1.00 EA 
260 1 1 1.00 EA  285 0.806 0.944 0.85 EA 
261 1 1 1.00 EA  286 0.684 0.79 0.87 EA 
262 0.928 1 0.93 EA  287 0.74 0.954 0.78 EA 
263 1 1 1.00 EA  288 0.712 0.918 0.78 EA 
264 1 1 1.00 EA  289 0.728 0.891 0.82 EA 
265 1 1 1.00 EA  290 0.868 0.933 0.93 EA 
266 1 1 1.00 EA  291 1 1 1.00 EA 
267 0.749 0.767 0.98 EA  292 0.692 1 0.69 EA 
268 0.716 0.767 0.93 EA  293 0.484 0.748 0.65 EA 
269 0.691 0.717 0.96 EA  294 0.579 1 0.58 EA 
270 0.709 0.774 0.92 EA  295 0.683 1 0.68 EA 
271 0.585 0.701 0.83 EA  296 0.51 0.805 0.63 EA 
272 0.524 0.628 0.83 EA  297 0.824 0.969 0.85 EA 
273 0.652 0.783 0.83 EA  298 0.536 0.725 0.74 EA 
274 0.765 0.921 0.83 EA  299 0.535 0.792 0.68 EA 
275 0.778 1 0.78 EA  300 0.505 0.679 0.74 EA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
301 0.467 0.621 0.75 EA  326 0.717 0.721 0.99 SA 
302 1 1 1.00 EA  327 0.808 0.898 0.90 SA 
303 0.643 1 0.64 EA  328 0.77 1 0.77 SA 
304 0.552 0.801 0.69 EA  329 1 1 1.00 SA 
305 0.971 1 0.97 EA  330 1 1 1.00 SA 
306 0.46 0.576 0.80 EA  331 0.758 0.759 1.00 SA 
307 0.364 0.543 0.67 EA  332 0.914 0.914 1.00 SA 
308 0.365 0.583 0.63 EA  333 0.91 0.912 1.00 SA 
309 0.413 0.651 0.63 EA  334 0.841 0.853 0.99 SA 
310 0.454 0.709 0.64 EA  335 0.802 0.824 0.97 SA 
311 0.408 0.62 0.66 EA  336 1 1 1.00 SA 
312 0.46 0.724 0.64 EA  337 1 1 1.00 SA 
313 0.447 0.692 0.65 EA  338 0.611 1 0.61 SA 
314 0.429 0.612 0.70 EA  339 0.495 0.807 0.61 SA 
315 0.359 0.501 0.72 EA  340 0.517 0.706 0.73 SA 
316 0.986 1 0.99 SA  341 0.545 0.677 0.81 SA 
317 1 1 1.00 SA  342 0.661 0.788 0.84 SA 
318 1 1 1.00 SA  343 0.694 0.729 0.95 SA 
319 1 1 1.00 SA  344 0.997 1 1.00 SA 
320 0.924 0.928 1.00 SA  345 1 1 1.00 SA 
321 1 1 1.00 SA  346 0.782 0.782 1.00 SA 
322 0.847 0.934 0.91 SA  347 1 1 1.00 SA 
323 0.582 0.628 0.93 SA  348 1 1 1.00 SA 
324 0.651 0.669 0.97 SA  349 0.954 1 0.95 SA 
325 0.607 0.707 0.86 SA  350 0.729 1 0.73 SA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
351 0.709 0.89 0.80 SA  376 0.804 0.804 1.00 SA 
352 0.58 0.669 0.87 SA  377 0.795 0.796 1.00 SA 
353 0.415 0.498 0.83 SA  378 0.92 0.92 1.00 SA 
354 0.366 0.384 0.95 SA  379 0.792 0.793 1.00 SA 
355 0.431 0.539 0.80 SA  380 0.673 0.725 0.93 SA 
356 0.798 1 0.80 SA  381 0.347 0.5 0.69 SA 
357 0.54 0.946 0.57 SA  382 0.345 0.465 0.74 SA 
358 0.712 0.963 0.74 SA  383 1 1 1.00 SA 
359 0.742 0.996 0.74 SA  384 0.55 0.556 0.99 SA 
360 0.569 0.912 0.62 SA  385 0.784 0.794 0.99 SA 
361 0.612 0.858 0.71 SA  386 0.587 0.592 0.99 SA 
362 0.406 0.67 0.61 SA  387 0.656 0.661 0.99 SA 
363 0.587 0.651 0.90 SA  388 0.72 0.729 0.99 SA 
364 0.704 1 0.70 SA  389 0.792 0.801 0.99 SA 
365 0.615 0.758 0.81 SA  390 0.795 0.8 0.99 SA 
366 0.666 0.883 0.75 SA  391 0.892 0.901 0.99 SA 
367 0.837 0.997 0.84 SA  392 0.903 1 0.90 SA 
368 0.899 1 0.90 SA  393 1 1 1.00 SA 
369 0.302 0.677 0.45 SA  394 0.991 1 0.99 SA 
370 0.431 0.616 0.70 SA  395 0.972 1 0.97 SA 
371 0.496 0.6 0.83 SA  396 0.96 0.992 0.97 SA 
372 0.453 0.534 0.85 SA  397 0.965 0.982 0.98 SA 
373 0.549 0.563 0.98 SA  398 1 1 1.00 SA 
374 0.574 0.575 1.00 SA  399 0.494 1 0.49 SA 
375 0.782 0.782 1.00 SA  400 0.41 0.79 0.52 SA 
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Appendix I: Continuation 
 
firm 
vrste
M 
vrste
G 
GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
401 0.533 0.764 0.70 SA  426 0.458 0.627 0.73 SA 
402 0.409 0.807 0.51 SA  427 0.488 0.598 0.82 SA 
403 0.625 0.73 0.86 SA  428 0.477 0.478 1.00 SA 
404 0.683 0.765 0.89 SA  429 0.496 0.496 1.00 SA 
405 0.331 0.495 0.67 SA  430 0.341 0.548 0.62 SA 
406 0.487 0.702 0.69 SA  431 0.369 0.555 0.66 SA 
407 0.594 0.803 0.74 SA  432 0.319 0.572 0.56 SA 
408 0.703 0.845 0.83 SA  433 0.381 0.653 0.58 SA 
409 0.709 0.894 0.79 SA  434 0.453 0.757 0.60 SA 
410 1 1 1.00 SA  435 0.368 0.94 0.39 SA 
411 0.963 1 0.96 SA  436 0.6 0.774 0.78 SA 
412 0.891 1 0.89 SA  437 0.404 0.735 0.55 SA 
413 0.736 0.979 0.75 SA  438 0.526 0.857 0.61 SA 
414 0.616 0.886 0.70 SA  439 0.421 0.648 0.65 SA 
415 0.598 0.819 0.73 SA  440 0.974 1 0.97 SA 
416 0.533 0.832 0.64 SA  441 0.469 0.807 0.58 SA 
417 0.521 0.78 0.67 SA  442 1 1 1.00 SA 
418 0.497 0.842 0.59 SA  443 0.995 0.995 1.00 SA 
419 0.432 0.904 0.48 SA  444 1 1 1.00 SA 
420 0.392 0.786 0.50 SA  445 1 1 1.00 SA 
421 0.354 0.929 0.38 SA  446 1 1 1.00 SA 
422 0.563 0.942 0.60 SA  447 1 1 1.00 SA 
423 0.454 1 0.45 SA  448 1 1 1.00 SA 
424 0.399 1 0.40 SA  449 1 1 1.00 SA 
425 0.493 0.812 0.61 SA  450 1 1 1.00 SA 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
451 0.734 0.893 0.82 SA  476 0.435 0.818 0.53 SUB 
452 0.553 0.862 0.64 SA  477 0.416 0.915 0.45 SUB 
453 0.5 0.611 0.82 SA  478 0.321 0.791 0.41 SUB 
454 0.506 0.664 0.76 SA  479 0.987 1 0.99 SUB 
455 0.594 0.676 0.88 SA  480 0.905 1 0.91 SUB 
456 0.736 0.881 0.84 SA  481 0.907 1 0.91 SUB 
457 0.786 0.884 0.89 SA  482 0.882 1 0.88 SUB 
458 0.846 1 0.85 SA  483 0.778 0.901 0.86 SUB 
459 1 1 1.00 SUB  484 0.876 1 0.88 SUB 
460 1 1 1.00 SUB  485 0.785 1 0.79 SUB 
461 0.671 1 0.67 SUB  486 0.697 1 0.70 SUB 
462 0.678 1 0.68 SUB  487 0.61 1 0.61 SUB 
463 0.597 1 0.60 SUB  488 1 1 1.00 SUB 
464 0.792 0.97 0.82 SUB  489 0.533 1 0.53 SUB 
465 0.714 1 0.71 SUB  490 0.582 0.84 0.69 SUB 
466 0.711 0.849 0.84 SUB  491 0.509 0.96 0.53 SUB 
467 0.928 1 0.93 SUB  492 0.536 0.933 0.57 SUB 
468 0.884 0.944 0.94 SUB  493 0.503 1 0.50 SUB 
469 0.778 0.826 0.94 SUB  494 0.439 0.912 0.48 SUB 
470 0.479 0.824 0.58 SUB  495 0.452 0.974 0.46 SUB 
471 0.478 0.796 0.60 SUB  496 0.443 1 0.44 SUB 
472 0.498 0.817 0.61 SUB  497 0.33 0.805 0.41 SUB 
473 0.4 0.788 0.51 SUB  498 0.468 1 0.47 SUB 
474 0.402 0.808 0.50 SUB  499 0.253 0.917 0.28 SUB 
475 0.422 0.785 0.54 SUB  500 0.566 1 0.57 SUB 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
501 0.399 1 0.40 SUB  526 0.953 0.972 0.98 SUB 
502 0.349 1 0.35 SUB  527 1 1 1.00 SUB 
503 0.403 1 0.40 SUB  528 0.858 1 0.86 SUB 
504 0.493 0.994 0.50 SUB  529 1 1 1.00 SUB 
505 0.534 1 0.53 SUB  530 0.898 1 0.90 SUB 
506 0.542 1 0.54 SUB  531 0.717 0.867 0.83 SUB 
507 0.453 1 0.45 SUB  532 0.674 0.863 0.78 SUB 
508 0.322 0.999 0.32 SUB  533 0.69 0.9 0.77 SUB 
509 0.245 0.896 0.27 SUB       
510 0.341 1 0.34 SUB       
511 0.419 0.925 0.45 SUB       
512 0.484 0.901 0.54 SUB       
513 0.541 1 0.54 SUB       
514 0.492 0.912 0.54 SUB       
515 0.462 0.977 0.47 SUB       
516 0.552 1 0.55 SUB       
517 0.271 1 0.27 SUB       
518 0.429 1 0.43 SUB       
519 0.424 1 0.42 SUB       
520 0.236 0.973 0.24 SUB       
521 0.232 0.883 0.26 SUB       
522 0.21 1 0.21 SUB       
523 0.23 0.988 0.23 SUB       
524 1 1 1.00 SUB       
525 0.891 0.98 0.91 SUB       
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Appendix II 
 Efficiency Scores for Meta Frontier, Group Frontier and the GAP: Model 2 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
1 1 1 1.00 LA  26 0.482 0.959 0.50 LA 
2 1 1 1.00 LA  27 0.526 1 0.53 LA 
3 1 1 1.00 LA  28 0.532 0.982 0.54 LA 
4 0.982 1 0.98 LA  29 0.522 0.962 0.54 LA 
5 0.796 0.981 0.81 LA  30 0.607 0.981 0.62 LA 
6 0.544 1 0.54 LA  31 0.631 1 0.63 LA 
7 1 1 1.00 LA  32 0.625 1 0.63 LA 
8 0.496 1 0.50 LA  33 0.598 1 0.60 LA 
9 0.503 1 0.50 LA  34 0.609 1 0.61 LA 
10 0.17 0.286 0.59 LA  35 0.654 1 0.65 LA 
11 0.184 0.295 0.62 LA  36 0.497 1 0.50 LA 
12 0.418 0.65 0.64 LA  37 0.399 0.679 0.59 LA 
13 0.296 0.442 0.67 LA  38 0.382 0.938 0.41 LA 
14 0.286 0.453 0.63 LA  39 0.383 0.947 0.40 LA 
15 0.354 0.523 0.68 LA  40 0.293 0.644 0.45 LA 
16 0.353 0.529 0.67 LA  41 0.255 0.637 0.40 LA 
17 0.361 0.545 0.66 LA  42 0.291 0.842 0.35 LA 
18 0.413 0.618 0.67 LA  43 0.242 0.72 0.34 LA 
19 0.74 0.955 0.77 LA  44 0.229 0.587 0.39 LA 
20 1 1 1.00 LA  45 0.201 0.573 0.35 LA 
21 1 1 1.00 LA  46 0.187 0.61 0.31 LA 
22 0.42 0.734 0.57 LA  47 0.292 0.784 0.37 LA 
23 0.398 0.712 0.56 LA  48 0.258 0.787 0.33 LA 
24 0.389 0.769 0.51 LA  49 0.259 0.828 0.31 LA 
25 0.404 0.876 0.46 LA  50 0.271 0.859 0.32 LA 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
51 0.299 0.883 0.34 LA  76 0.354 0.858 0.41 LA 
52 0.332 0.872 0.38 LA  77 0.438 0.952 0.46 LA 
53 0.37 0.886 0.42 LA  78 0.475 1 0.48 LA 
54 0.386 0.792 0.49 LA  79 0.379 0.99 0.38 LA 
55 0.421 0.744 0.57 LA  80 0.447 1 0.45 LA 
56 0.565 0.891 0.63 LA  81 0.494 1 0.49 LA 
57 0.517 0.895 0.58 LA  82 0.485 0.987 0.49 LA 
58 0.586 0.961 0.61 LA  83 0.61 1 0.61 LA 
59 0.601 1 0.60 LA  84 0.532 0.957 0.56 LA 
60 1 1 1.00 LA  85 0.47 0.897 0.52 LA 
61 0.22 0.36 0.61 LA  86 0.449 0.962 0.47 LA 
62 0.542 0.846 0.64 LA  87 0.416 0.749 0.56 LA 
63 0.308 0.711 0.43 LA  88 0.498 0.712 0.70 LA 
64 1 1 1.00 LA  89 0.712 1 0.71 LA 
65 0.422 1 0.42 LA  90 0.392 0.779 0.50 LA 
66 0.6 1 0.60 LA  91 0.404 0.775 0.52 LA 
67 0.444 0.948 0.47 LA  92 0.434 0.868 0.50 LA 
68 0.389 0.885 0.44 LA  93 0.563 1 0.56 LA 
69 0.373 0.944 0.40 LA  94 0.493 1 0.49 LA 
70 0.366 0.934 0.39 LA  95 0.451 0.736 0.61 LA 
71 0.341 0.877 0.39 LA  96 1 1 1.00 LA 
72 0.355 0.9 0.39 LA  97 1 1 1.00 LA 
73 0.405 0.945 0.43 LA  98 0.907 1 0.91 LA 
74 0.461 1 0.46 LA  99 0.959 1 0.96 LA 
75 0.375 1 0.38 LA  100 0.263 0.444 0.59 LA 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
101 0.278 0.491 0.57 LA  126 0.341 0.514 0.66 MENA 
102 0.319 0.523 0.61 LA  127 0.373 0.526 0.71 MENA 
103 0.296 0.508 0.58 LA  128 0.517 0.836 0.62 MENA 
104 0.281 0.466 0.60 LA  129 0.231 0.43 0.54 MENA 
105 0.459 0.917 0.50 LA  130 0.298 0.511 0.58 MENA 
106 0.465 0.953 0.49 LA  131 0.314 0.522 0.60 MENA 
107 0.299 0.557 0.54 LA  132 0.338 0.556 0.61 MENA 
108 0.288 0.725 0.40 LA  133 0.895 1 0.90 MENA 
109 0.273 0.655 0.42 LA  134 0.861 1 0.86 MENA 
110 0.377 0.777 0.49 LA  135 0.629 1 0.63 MENA 
111 0.432 0.832 0.52 LA  136 0.472 1 0.47 MENA 
112 0.408 0.869 0.47 LA  137 0.639 1 0.64 MENA 
113 0.348 0.766 0.45 LA  138 0.539 0.945 0.57 MENA 
114 0.545 0.921 0.59 LA  139 0.645 1 0.65 MENA 
115 0.704 0.973 0.72 LA  140 0.579 0.957 0.61 MENA 
116 0.686 1 0.69 LA  141 0.582 0.974 0.60 MENA 
117 0.689 1 0.69 LA  142 0.65 1 0.65 MENA 
118 0.513 1 0.51 LA  143 0.66 1 0.66 MENA 
119 0.471 1 0.47 LA  144 0.219 0.416 0.53 MENA 
120 0.32 0.691 0.46 LA  145 0.245 0.416 0.59 MENA 
121 0.313 0.637 0.49 LA  146 0.296 0.536 0.55 MENA 
122 0.496 1 0.50 MENA  147 0.377 0.75 0.50 MENA 
123 0.487 0.812 0.60 MENA  148 0.475 0.806 0.59 MENA 
124 0.538 0.81 0.66 MENA  149 0.516 0.901 0.57 MENA 
125 0.418 0.676 0.62 MENA  150 0.446 0.817 0.55 MENA 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
151 0.43 0.852 0.50 MENA  176 0.416 1 0.42 MENA 
152 0.466 0.914 0.51 MENA  177 0.326 0.806 0.40 MENA 
153 0.441 0.884 0.50 MENA  178 0.254 0.744 0.34 MENA 
154 0.4 0.918 0.44 MENA  179 0.246 0.701 0.35 MENA 
155 0.499 1 0.50 MENA  180 0.278 0.714 0.39 MENA 
156 0.312 1 0.31 MENA  181 0.326 0.741 0.44 MENA 
157 0.249 0.691 0.36 MENA  182 0.491 0.976 0.50 MENA 
158 0.273 0.676 0.40 MENA  183 0.589 1 0.59 MENA 
159 0.49 1 0.49 MENA  184 0.687 1 0.69 MENA 
160 0.277 0.543 0.51 MENA  185 0.51 0.831 0.61 MENA 
161 0.153 0.38 0.40 MENA  186 0.399 0.658 0.61 MENA 
162 0.277 0.533 0.52 MENA  187 0.383 0.752 0.51 MENA 
163 0.287 0.524 0.55 MENA  188 0.318 0.679 0.47 MENA 
164 0.223 0.439 0.51 MENA  189 0.293 0.628 0.47 MENA 
165 0.191 0.384 0.50 MENA  190 0.388 0.93 0.42 MENA 
166 0.199 0.361 0.55 MENA  191 0.261 0.754 0.35 MENA 
167 0.21 0.365 0.58 MENA  192 0.273 0.667 0.41 MENA 
168 0.182 0.322 0.57 MENA  193 0.786 1 0.79 MENA 
169 0.554 0.775 0.71 MENA  194 1 1 1.00 MENA 
170 0.298 0.804 0.37 MENA  195 0.54 0.765 0.71 MENA 
171 0.255 0.685 0.37 MENA  196 0.417 0.625 0.67 MENA 
172 0.831 1 0.83 MENA  197 0.575 0.718 0.80 MENA 
173 0.556 1 0.56 MENA  198 0.329 0.446 0.74 MENA 
174 0.453 0.826 0.55 MENA  199 0.619 0.805 0.77 MENA 
175 0.354 0.792 0.45 MENA  200 0.364 0.67 0.54 MENA 
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firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
201 0.392 0.579 0.68 MENA  226 0.519 1 0.52 MENA 
202 0.332 0.507 0.65 MENA  227 0.452 0.997 0.45 MENA 
203 0.368 0.578 0.64 MENA  228 0.336 0.921 0.36 MENA 
204 0.3 0.425 0.71 MENA  229 0.191 0.915 0.21 MENA 
205 0.313 0.772 0.41 MENA  230 0.758 0.844 0.90 EA 
206 0.365 0.716 0.51 MENA  231 0.819 0.939 0.87 EA 
207 0.468 1 0.47 MENA  232 0.706 0.921 0.77 EA 
208 0.518 1 0.52 MENA  233 0.634 0.81 0.78 EA 
209 0.597 1 0.60 MENA  234 0.71 0.983 0.72 EA 
210 0.54 0.976 0.55 MENA  235 0.557 0.938 0.59 EA 
211 0.514 1 0.51 MENA  236 0.502 0.747 0.67 EA 
212 0.504 1 0.50 MENA  237 0.375 0.668 0.56 EA 
213 0.497 1 0.50 MENA  238 0.303 0.54 0.56 EA 
214 0.425 1 0.43 MENA  239 0.299 0.437 0.68 EA 
215 0.387 0.945 0.41 MENA  240 0.363 0.428 0.85 EA 
216 0.409 1 0.41 MENA  241 0.441 0.467 0.94 EA 
217 0.399 1 0.40 MENA  242 0.484 0.507 0.95 EA 
218 0.432 1 0.43 MENA  243 0.653 0.688 0.95 EA 
219 0.297 0.837 0.35 MENA  244 0.346 0.6 0.58 EA 
220 0.542 1 0.54 MENA  245 0.29 0.636 0.46 EA 
221 0.575 1 0.58 MENA  246 0.278 0.763 0.36 EA 
222 0.373 0.987 0.38 MENA  247 0.296 0.863 0.34 EA 
223 0.443 1 0.44 MENA  248 0.383 1 0.38 EA 
224 0.74 1 0.74 MENA  249 0.315 0.863 0.37 EA 
225 0.504 0.911 0.55 MENA  250 0.385 0.96 0.40 EA 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
251 0.37 1 0.37 EA  276 0.404 1 0.40 EA 
252 0.346 0.877 0.39 EA  277 0.47 1 0.47 EA 
253 0.394 0.956 0.41 EA  278 0.535 1 0.54 EA 
254 0.371 0.973 0.38 EA  279 0.412 0.561 0.73 EA 
255 0.889 1 0.89 EA  280 0.519 0.714 0.73 EA 
256 0.766 1 0.77 EA  281 0.364 0.466 0.78 EA 
257 0.722 0.917 0.79 EA  282 0.428 0.66 0.65 EA 
258 0.537 0.611 0.88 EA  283 0.513 0.676 0.76 EA 
259 0.788 0.814 0.97 EA  284 0.566 0.667 0.85 EA 
260 1 1 1.00 EA  285 0.402 0.437 0.92 EA 
261 1 1 1.00 EA  286 0.402 0.428 0.94 EA 
262 0.926 1 0.93 EA  287 0.391 0.446 0.88 EA 
263 1 1 1.00 EA  288 0.441 0.495 0.89 EA 
264 1 1 1.00 EA  289 0.455 0.497 0.92 EA 
265 0.374 1 0.37 EA  290 0.614 0.661 0.93 EA 
266 0.4 0.757 0.53 EA  291 0.733 0.783 0.94 EA 
267 0.335 0.404 0.83 EA  292 0.563 0.584 0.96 EA 
268 0.456 0.551 0.83 EA  293 0.392 0.729 0.54 EA 
269 0.462 0.521 0.89 EA  294 0.427 1 0.43 EA 
270 0.469 0.5 0.94 EA  295 0.552 1 0.55 EA 
271 0.384 0.439 0.87 EA  296 0.418 0.77 0.54 EA 
272 0.358 0.383 0.93 EA  297 0.807 0.969 0.83 EA 
273 0.501 0.532 0.94 EA  298 0.509 0.691 0.74 EA 
274 0.603 0.635 0.95 EA  299 0.522 0.782 0.67 EA 
275 0.636 0.664 0.96 EA  300 0.488 0.658 0.74 EA 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
301 0.439 0.578 0.76 EA  326 0.716 0.721 0.99 SA 
302 1 1 1.00 EA  327 0.805 0.876 0.92 SA 
303 0.523 1 0.52 EA  328 0.768 1 0.77 SA 
304 0.4 0.801 0.50 EA  329 1 1 1.00 SA 
305 0.861 1 0.86 EA  330 1 1 1.00 SA 
306 0.36 0.48 0.75 EA  331 0.758 0.758 1.00 SA 
307 0.313 0.451 0.69 EA  332 0.914 0.914 1.00 SA 
308 0.328 0.512 0.64 EA  333 0.909 0.909 1.00 SA 
309 0.37 0.564 0.66 EA  334 0.84 0.841 1.00 SA 
310 0.424 0.651 0.65 EA  335 0.801 0.814 0.98 SA 
311 0.375 0.559 0.67 EA  336 1 1 1.00 SA 
312 0.44 0.684 0.64 EA  337 1 1 1.00 SA 
313 0.426 0.645 0.66 EA  338 0.382 1 0.38 SA 
314 0.407 0.565 0.72 EA  339 0.453 0.531 0.85 SA 
315 0.332 0.435 0.76 EA  340 0.486 0.489 0.99 SA 
316 0.986 0.987 1.00 SA  341 0.544 0.567 0.96 SA 
317 1 1 1.00 SA  342 0.658 0.723 0.91 SA 
318 1 1 1.00 SA  343 0.694 0.696 1.00 SA 
319 1 1 1.00 SA  344 0.996 0.997 1.00 SA 
320 0.923 0.923 1.00 SA  345 1 1 1.00 SA 
321 1 1 1.00 SA  346 0.782 0.782 1.00 SA 
322 0.838 0.859 0.98 SA  347 1 1 1.00 SA 
323 0.575 0.575 1.00 SA  348 1 1 1.00 SA 
324 0.648 0.649 1.00 SA  349 0.954 1 0.95 SA 
325 0.603 0.649 0.93 SA  350 0.688 1 0.69 SA 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
351 0.694 0.89 0.78 SA  376 0.804 0.804 1.00 SA 
352 0.576 0.669 0.86 SA  377 0.795 0.795 1.00 SA 
353 0.41 0.41 1.00 SA  378 0.92 0.92 1.00 SA 
354 0.365 0.367 0.99 SA  379 0.792 0.792 1.00 SA 
355 0.428 0.489 0.88 SA  380 0.667 0.667 1.00 SA 
356 0.798 1 0.80 SA  381 0.34 0.427 0.80 SA 
357 0.505 0.513 0.98 SA  382 0.34 0.387 0.88 SA 
358 0.688 0.688 1.00 SA  383 1 1 1.00 SA 
359 0.729 0.729 1.00 SA  384 0.55 0.556 0.99 SA 
360 0.552 0.552 1.00 SA  385 0.784 0.793 0.99 SA 
361 0.593 0.593 1.00 SA  386 0.587 0.592 0.99 SA 
362 0.384 0.384 1.00 SA  387 0.656 0.661 0.99 SA 
363 0.577 0.577 1.00 SA  388 0.72 0.729 0.99 SA 
364 0.695 0.71 0.98 SA  389 0.792 0.801 0.99 SA 
365 0.601 0.601 1.00 SA  390 0.795 0.8 0.99 SA 
366 0.651 0.651 1.00 SA  391 0.892 0.901 0.99 SA 
367 0.818 0.827 0.99 SA  392 0.902 0.988 0.91 SA 
368 0.88 0.961 0.92 SA  393 1 1 1.00 SA 
369 0.267 0.285 0.94 SA  394 0.989 0.997 0.99 SA 
370 0.411 0.42 0.98 SA  395 0.972 1 0.97 SA 
371 0.484 0.488 0.99 SA  396 0.96 0.986 0.97 SA 
372 0.448 0.455 0.98 SA  397 0.965 0.982 0.98 SA 
373 0.547 0.547 1.00 SA  398 1 1 1.00 SA 
374 0.574 0.575 1.00 SA  399 0.351 1 0.35 SA 
375 0.782 0.782 1.00 SA  400 0.379 0.618 0.61 SA 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
401 0.519 0.684 0.76 SA  426 0.455 0.459 0.99 SA 
402 0.398 0.493 0.81 SA  427 0.488 0.598 0.82 SA 
403 0.622 0.71 0.88 SA  428 0.477 0.478 1.00 SA 
404 0.682 0.747 0.91 SA  429 0.496 0.496 1.00 SA 
405 0.329 0.343 0.96 SA  430 0.33 0.33 1.00 SA 
406 0.483 0.585 0.83 SA  431 0.361 0.371 0.97 SA 
407 0.59 0.717 0.82 SA  432 0.309 0.338 0.91 SA 
408 0.699 0.835 0.84 SA  433 0.373 0.437 0.85 SA 
409 0.707 0.894 0.79 SA  434 0.418 0.455 0.92 SA 
410 1 1 1.00 SA  435 0.289 0.32 0.90 SA 
411 0.917 1 0.92 SA  436 0.547 0.61 0.90 SA 
412 0.833 0.833 1.00 SA  437 0.37 0.393 0.94 SA 
413 0.663 0.688 0.96 SA  438 0.506 0.527 0.96 SA 
414 0.53 0.632 0.84 SA  439 0.398 0.415 0.96 SA 
415 0.519 0.573 0.91 SA  440 0.974 1 0.97 SA 
416 0.451 0.496 0.91 SA  441 0.419 0.438 0.96 SA 
417 0.45 0.551 0.82 SA  442 1 1 1.00 SA 
418 0.431 0.548 0.79 SA  443 0.995 0.995 1.00 SA 
419 0.36 0.379 0.95 SA  444 1 1 1.00 SA 
420 0.378 0.421 0.90 SA  445 1 1 1.00 SA 
421 0.322 0.357 0.90 SA  446 1 1 1.00 SA 
422 0.544 0.805 0.68 SA  447 1 1 1.00 SA 
423 0.429 0.591 0.73 SA  448 1 1 1.00 SA 
424 0.358 0.441 0.81 SA  449 1 1 1.00 SA 
425 0.479 0.508 0.94 SA  450 1 1 1.00 SA 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
451 0.732 0.831 0.88 SA  476 0.399 0.777 0.51 SUB 
452 0.529 0.694 0.76 SA  477 0.363 0.908 0.40 SUB 
453 0.497 0.513 0.97 SA  478 0.229 0.769 0.30 SUB 
454 0.503 0.664 0.76 SA  479 0.782 1 0.78 SUB 
455 0.594 0.676 0.88 SA  480 0.793 1 0.79 SUB 
456 0.736 0.881 0.84 SA  481 0.881 1 0.88 SUB 
457 0.786 0.884 0.89 SA  482 0.876 1 0.88 SUB 
458 0.844 1 0.84 SA  483 0.761 0.901 0.84 SUB 
459 0.812 1 0.81 SUB  484 0.856 1 0.86 SUB 
460 0.722 1 0.72 SUB  485 0.449 1 0.45 SUB 
461 0.591 1 0.59 SUB  486 0.593 1 0.59 SUB 
462 0.592 1 0.59 SUB  487 0.489 1 0.49 SUB 
463 0.129 0.849 0.15 SUB  488 1 1 1.00 SUB 
464 0.184 0.89 0.21 SUB  489 0.286 0.996 0.29 SUB 
465 0.213 0.996 0.21 SUB  490 0.232 0.686 0.34 SUB 
466 0.201 0.8 0.25 SUB  491 0.281 0.933 0.30 SUB 
467 0.241 1 0.24 SUB  492 0.296 0.889 0.33 SUB 
468 0.192 0.68 0.28 SUB  493 0.319 1 0.32 SUB 
469 0.157 0.519 0.30 SUB  494 0.298 0.879 0.34 SUB 
470 0.247 0.698 0.35 SUB  495 0.35 0.966 0.36 SUB 
471 0.339 0.676 0.50 SUB  496 0.347 1 0.35 SUB 
472 0.422 0.774 0.55 SUB  497 0.185 0.644 0.29 SUB 
473 0.353 0.699 0.51 SUB  498 0.446 1 0.45 SUB 
474 0.369 0.771 0.48 SUB  499 0.209 0.888 0.24 SUB 
475 0.405 0.771 0.53 SUB  500 0.559 1 0.56 SUB 
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Appendix 2: Continuation 
 
firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region  firm vrsteM vrsteG GAP Region 
501 0.399 1 0.40 SUB  526 0.175 0.807 0.22 SUB 
502 0.349 0.981 0.36 SUB  527 0.196 0.872 0.22 SUB 
503 0.403 1 0.40 SUB  528 0.194 0.887 0.22 SUB 
504 0.493 0.977 0.50 SUB  529 0.184 0.78 0.24 SUB 
505 0.534 1 0.53 SUB  530 0.378 0.986 0.38 SUB 
506 0.477 1 0.48 SUB  531 0.205 0.52 0.39 SUB 
507 0.387 1 0.39 SUB  532 0.237 0.566 0.42 SUB 
508 0.285 0.999 0.29 SUB  533 0.273 0.648 0.42 SUB 
509 0.209 0.896 0.23 SUB       
510 0.291 1 0.29 SUB       
511 0.21 0.891 0.24 SUB       
512 0.272 0.853 0.32 SUB       
513 0.34 0.922 0.37 SUB       
514 0.398 0.844 0.47 SUB       
515 0.388 0.963 0.40 SUB       
516 0.513 1 0.51 SUB       
517 0.252 1 0.25 SUB       
518 0.415 1 0.42 SUB       
519 0.413 1 0.41 SUB       
520 0.219 0.971 0.23 SUB       
521 0.207 0.864 0.24 SUB       
522 0.157 1 0.16 SUB       
523 0.178 0.986 0.18 SUB       
524 0.151 0.812 0.19 SUB       
525 0.169 0.592 0.29 SUB       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 75 
 
Appendix III 
Peer Count Summary: Model 1 
firm 
peer 
count 
Region   firm 
peer 
count 
Region 
1 92 Latin America  317 5 South Asia 
2 4 Latin America  319 45 South Asia 
3 109 Latin America  321 8 South Asia 
7 10 Latin America  329 60 South Asia 
12 110 Latin America  336 29 South Asia 
20 31 Latin America  337 39 South Asia 
21 51 Latin America  345 5 South Asia 
60 26 Latin America  347 1 South Asia 
64 26 Latin America  348 9 South Asia 
96 1 Latin America  383 35 South Asia 
97 8 Latin America  393 1 South Asia 
110 36 Latin America  398 8 South Asia 
111 104 Latin America  410 12 South Asia 
194 24 MENA  442 127 South Asia 
255 1 East Asia  444 32 South Asia 
260 14 East Asia  445 13 South Asia 
261 108 East Asia  446 17 South Asia 
263 42 East Asia  448 64 South Asia 
265 73 East Asia  449 4 South Asia 
266 72 East Asia  450 123 South Asia 
277 3 East Asia  459 25 South Asia 
278 25 East Asia  488 4 Sub-Sahara 
282 1 East Asia  524 53 Sub-Sahara 
283 55 East Asia  527 10 Sub-Sahara 
291 7 East Asia  529 21 Sub-Sahara 
302 396 East Asia     
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Appendix IV 
Peer Count Summary: Model 2 
Firm 
Peer 
count 
Region   Firm 
Peer 
count 
Region  
1 143 Latin America  330 5 South Asia 
2 13 Latin America  336 20 South Asia 
3 101 Latin America  337 28 South Asia 
7 16 Latin America  345 5 South Asia 
20 27 Latin America  347 1 South Asia 
21 17 Latin America  348 7 South Asia 
60 29 Latin America  383 44 South Asia 
64 68 Latin America  393 1 South Asia 
97 21 Latin America  398 8 South Asia 
194 25 MENA  410 18 South Asia 
260 20 MENA  442 196 South Asia 
261 109 MENA  444 38 South Asia 
263 56 MENA  445 12 South Asia 
302 428 East Asia  446 12 South Asia 
317 4 South Asia  448 40 South Asia 
319 52 South Asia  449 4 South Asia 
321 7 South Asia  450 121 South Asia 
329 51 South Asia  488 2 Sub-Saharan  
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Appendix V 
Latin America Efficiency Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
1 1 1  42 0.874 0.842  83 1 1 
2 1 1  43 0.753 0.72  84 0.957 0.957 
3 1 1  44 0.627 0.587  85 0.897 0.897 
4 1 1  45 0.604 0.573  86 0.984 0.962 
5 0.982 0.981  46 0.636 0.61  87 0.933 0.749 
6 1 1  47 0.992 0.784  88 1 0.712 
7 1 1  48 0.884 0.787  89 1 1 
8 1 1  49 0.861 0.828  90 0.816 0.779 
9 1 1  50 0.88 0.859  91 0.813 0.775 
10 0.688 0.286  51 0.904 0.883  92 0.868 0.868 
11 0.57 0.295  52 0.886 0.872  93 1 1 
12 1 0.65  53 0.897 0.886  94 1 1 
13 0.78 0.442  54 0.816 0.792  95 0.736 0.736 
14 0.666 0.453  55 0.765 0.744  96 1 1 
15 0.676 0.523  56 0.891 0.891  97 1 1 
16 0.544 0.529  57 0.902 0.895  98 1 1 
17 0.545 0.545  58 0.961 0.961  99 1 1 
18 0.618 0.618  59 1 1  100 0.482 0.444 
19 0.955 0.955  60 1 1  101 0.491 0.491 
20 1 1  61 0.604 0.36  102 0.523 0.523 
21 1 1  62 1 0.846  103 0.508 0.508 
22 0.848 0.734  63 0.711 0.711  104 0.479 0.466 
23 0.969 0.712  64 1 1  105 1 0.917 
24 0.909 0.769  65 1 1  106 1 0.953 
25 0.931 0.876  66 1 1  107 0.723 0.557 
26 1 0.959  67 0.948 0.948  108 0.767 0.725 
27 1 1  68 0.899 0.885  109 0.761 0.655 
28 0.99 0.982  69 0.958 0.944  110 1 0.777 
29 0.97 0.962  70 0.944 0.934  111 1 0.832 
30 0.985 0.981  71 0.883 0.877  112 0.979 0.869 
31 1 1  72 0.901 0.9  113 0.853 0.766 
32 1 1  73 0.945 0.945  114 0.921 0.921 
33 1 1  74 1 1  115 0.973 0.973 
34 1 1  75 1 1  116 1 1 
35 1 1  76 0.925 0.858  117 1 1 
36 1 1  77 1 0.952  118 1 1 
37 0.815 0.679  78 1 1  119 1 1 
38 0.993 0.938  79 1 0.99  120 0.692 0.691 
39 1 0.947  80 1 1  121 0.648 0.637 
40 0.7 0.644  81 1 1     
41 0.679 0.637  82 0.987 0.987     
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Appendix VI 
MENA Efficiency Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
1 1 1  37 0.711 0.676  73 1 1 
2 0.874 0.812  38 1 1  74 0.876 0.765 
3 0.892 0.81  39 0.63 0.543  75 0.704 0.625 
4 0.695 0.676  40 0.412 0.38  76 0.958 0.718 
5 0.599 0.514  41 0.592 0.533  77 0.875 0.446 
6 0.552 0.526  42 0.612 0.524  78 0.854 0.805 
7 0.836 0.836  43 0.538 0.439  79 0.889 0.67 
8 0.45 0.43  44 0.501 0.384  80 0.751 0.579 
9 0.551 0.511  45 0.499 0.361  81 0.687 0.507 
10 0.546 0.522  46 0.455 0.365  82 0.751 0.578 
11 0.61 0.556  47 0.486 0.322  83 0.599 0.425 
12 1 1  48 0.825 0.775  84 0.956 0.772 
13 1 1  49 0.874 0.804  85 0.951 0.716 
14 1 1  50 0.869 0.685  86 1 1 
15 1 1  51 1 1  87 1 1 
16 1 1  52 1 1  88 1 1 
17 0.945 0.945  53 0.884 0.826  89 0.98 0.976 
18 1 1  54 0.918 0.792  90 1 1 
19 0.964 0.957  55 1 1  91 1 1 
20 0.977 0.974  56 0.903 0.806  92 1 1 
21 1 1  57 0.94 0.744  93 1 1 
22 1 1  58 0.924 0.701  94 0.945 0.945 
23 0.452 0.416  59 0.874 0.714  95 1 1 
24 0.467 0.416  60 0.741 0.741  96 1 1 
25 0.584 0.536  61 0.976 0.976  97 1 1 
26 0.75 0.75  62 1 1  98 0.951 0.837 
27 0.806 0.806  63 1 1  99 1 1 
28 0.901 0.901  64 0.88 0.831  100 1 1 
29 0.817 0.817  65 0.71 0.658  101 0.987 0.987 
30 0.852 0.852  66 0.774 0.752  102 1 1 
31 0.914 0.914  67 0.727 0.679  103 1 1 
32 0.884 0.884  68 0.714 0.628  104 0.915 0.911 
33 0.918 0.918  69 0.932 0.93  105 1 1 
34 1 1  70 0.834 0.754  106 0.997 0.997 
35 1 1  71 0.784 0.667  107 0.921 0.921 
36 0.759 0.691  72 1 1  108 0.915 0.915 
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Appendix VII 
East Asia Efficiency Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
1 0.844 0.844  30 0.827 0.814  59 0.918 0.495 
2 0.939 0.939  31 1 1  60 0.891 0.497 
3 0.921 0.921  32 1 1  61 0.933 0.661 
4 0.825 0.81  33 1 1  62 1 0.783 
5 1 0.983  34 1 1  63 1 0.584 
6 0.993 0.938  35 1 1  64 0.748 0.729 
7 0.778 0.747  36 1 1  65 1 1 
8 0.729 0.668  37 1 0.757  66 1 1 
9 0.605 0.54  38 0.767 0.404  67 0.805 0.77 
10 0.525 0.437  39 0.767 0.551  68 0.969 0.969 
11 0.527 0.428  40 0.717 0.521  69 0.725 0.691 
12 0.523 0.467  41 0.774 0.5  70 0.792 0.782 
13 0.547 0.507  42 0.701 0.439  71 0.679 0.658 
14 0.748 0.688  43 0.628 0.383  72 0.621 0.578 
15 0.6 0.6  44 0.783 0.532  73 1 1 
16 0.636 0.636  45 0.921 0.635  74 1 1 
17 0.763 0.763  46 1 0.664  75 0.801 0.801 
18 0.863 0.863  47 1 1  76 1 1 
19 1 1  48 1 1  77 0.576 0.48 
20 0.863 0.863  49 1 1  78 0.543 0.451 
21 0.96 0.96  50 0.66 0.561  79 0.583 0.512 
22 1 1  51 0.797 0.714  80 0.651 0.564 
23 0.877 0.877  52 0.746 0.466  81 0.709 0.651 
24 0.956 0.956  53 1 0.66  82 0.62 0.559 
25 0.973 0.973  54 1 0.676  83 0.724 0.684 
26 1 1  55 1 0.667  84 0.692 0.645 
27 1 1  56 0.944 0.437  85 0.612 0.565 
28 0.932 0.917  57 0.79 0.428  86 0.501 0.435 
29 0.636 0.611  58 0.954 0.446     
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Appendix VIII 
South Asia Efficiency Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
1 1 0.987  31 0.782 0.782  61 0.804 0.804 
2 1 1  32 1 1  62 0.796 0.795 
3 1 1  33 1 1  63 0.92 0.92 
4 1 1  34 1 1  64 0.793 0.792 
5 0.928 0.923  35 1 1  65 0.725 0.667 
6 1 1  36 0.89 0.89  66 0.5 0.427 
7 0.934 0.859  37 0.669 0.669  67 0.465 0.387 
8 0.628 0.575  38 0.498 0.41  68 1 1 
9 0.669 0.649  39 0.384 0.367  69 0.556 0.556 
10 0.707 0.649  40 0.539 0.489  70 0.794 0.793 
11 0.721 0.721  41 1 1  71 0.592 0.592 
12 0.898 0.876  42 0.946 0.513  72 0.661 0.661 
13 1 1  43 0.963 0.688  73 0.729 0.729 
14 1 1  44 0.996 0.729  74 0.801 0.801 
15 1 1  45 0.912 0.552  75 0.8 0.8 
16 0.759 0.758  46 0.858 0.593  76 0.901 0.901 
17 0.914 0.914  47 0.67 0.384  77 1 0.988 
18 0.912 0.909  48 0.651 0.577  78 1 1 
19 0.853 0.841  49 1 0.71  79 1 0.997 
20 0.824 0.814  50 0.758 0.601  80 1 1 
21 1 1  51 0.883 0.651  81 0.992 0.986 
22 1 1  52 0.997 0.827  82 0.982 0.982 
23 1 1  53 1 0.961  83 1 1 
24 0.807 0.531  54 0.677 0.285  84 1 1 
25 0.706 0.489  55 0.616 0.42  85 0.79 0.618 
26 0.677 0.567  56 0.6 0.488  86 0.764 0.684 
27 0.788 0.723  57 0.534 0.455  87 0.807 0.493 
28 0.729 0.696  58 0.563 0.547  88 0.73 0.71 
29 1 0.997  59 0.575 0.575  89 0.765 0.747 
30 1 1  60 0.782 0.782  90 0.495 0.343 
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Appendix VIII: continuation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
91 0.702 0.585  111 0.627 0.459  131 1 1 
92 0.803 0.717  112 0.598 0.598  132 1 1 
93 0.845 0.835  113 0.478 0.478  133 1 1 
94 0.894 0.894  114 0.496 0.496  134 1 1 
95 1 1  115 0.548 0.33  135 1 1 
96 1 1  116 0.555 0.371  136 0.893 0.831 
97 1 0.833  117 0.572 0.338  137 0.862 0.694 
98 0.979 0.688  118 0.653 0.437  138 0.611 0.513 
99 0.886 0.632  119 0.757 0.455  139 0.664 0.664 
100 0.819 0.573  120 0.94 0.32  140 0.676 0.676 
101 0.832 0.496  121 0.774 0.61  141 0.881 0.881 
102 0.78 0.551  122 0.735 0.393  142 0.884 0.884 
103 0.842 0.548  123 0.857 0.527  143 1 1 
104 0.904 0.379  124 0.648 0.415     
105 0.786 0.421  125 1 1     
106 0.929 0.357  126 0.807 0.438     
107 0.942 0.805  127 1 1     
108 1 0.591  128 0.995 0.995     
109 1 0.441  129 1 1     
110 0.812 0.508  130 1 1     
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Appendix IX 
Sub-Saharan Africa Efficiency cores 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 
Model 
2 
  Model 1 Model 2 
firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste  firm vrste vrste 
1 1 1  26 1 1  51 0.896 0.896 
2 1 1  27 1 1  52 1 1 
3 1 1  28 1 1  53 0.925 0.891 
4 1 1  29 1 1  54 0.901 0.853 
5 1 0.849  30 1 1  55 1 0.922 
6 0.97 0.89  31 1 0.996  56 0.912 0.844 
7 1 0.996  32 0.84 0.686  57 0.977 0.963 
8 0.849 0.8  33 0.96 0.933  58 1 1 
9 1 1  34 0.933 0.889  59 1 1 
10 0.944 0.68  35 1 1  60 1 1 
11 0.826 0.519  36 0.912 0.879  61 1 1 
12 0.824 0.698  37 0.974 0.966  62 0.973 0.971 
13 0.796 0.676  38 1 1  63 0.883 0.864 
14 0.817 0.774  39 0.805 0.644  64 1 1 
15 0.788 0.699  40 1 1  65 0.988 0.986 
16 0.808 0.771  41 0.917 0.888  66 1 0.812 
17 0.785 0.771  42 1 1  67 0.98 0.592 
18 0.818 0.777  43 1 1  68 0.972 0.807 
19 0.915 0.908  44 1 0.981  69 1 0.872 
20 0.791 0.769  45 1 1  70 1 0.887 
21 1 1  46 0.994 0.977  71 1 0.78 
22 1 1  47 1 1  72 1 0.986 
23 1 1  48 1 1  73 0.867 0.52 
24 1 1  49 1 1  74 0.863 0.566 
25 0.901 0.901  50 0.999 0.999  75 0.9 0.648 
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Appendix X 
Average Efficiency Score Hypothesis Results for Model 1 
Wilcoxon Scores for vrsteM Classified by Region 
Region N 
Sum of 
Scores 
Expected 
Under H0 
Std Dev 
Under H0 
Mean 
Score 
Latin America 121 32288 32307 1488.57 266.84 
MENA 108 18398 28836 1428.34 170.35 
East Asia 86 25426 22962 1307.16 295.65 
South Asia 143 46965 38181 1574.4 328.43 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
75 19234 20025 1235.63 256.45 
Average scores were used for ties  
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test  
Chi-Square 68.69 
DF 4 
Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 
 
Appendix XI 
Average Efficiency Scores Hypothesis Results for Model 2 
Wilcoxon Scores for vrsteM Classified by Region 
Region N 
Sum of 
Scores 
Expected 
Under H0 
Std Dev 
Under H0 
Mean 
Score 
Latin America 121 29944 32307 1489.11 247.47 
MENA 108 23512 28836 1428.87 217.70 
East Asia 86 23598 22962 1307.64 274.40 
South Asia 143 53083.5 38181 1575.02 371.21 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
75 12173.5 20025 1236.09 162.31 
Average scores were used for ties. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Chi-Square 113.39 
DF 4 
Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
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Appendix XII 
GAP Distribution Hypothesis Results for Model 1 
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable GAP 
Classified by Variable Region 
Region N 
Sum of 
Scores 
Expected 
Under 
H0 
Std Dev 
Under 
H0 
Mean 
Score 
Latin America 121 30021 32307 1488.14 248.10 
MENA 108 16693 28836 1427.94 154.56 
East Asia 86 27810 22962 1306.79 323.37 
South Asia 143 51955 38181 1574.00 363.32 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
75 15833 20025 1235.28 211.10 
Average scores were used for ties. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Chi-Square 136.9614 
DF 4 
Pr > Chi-
Square 
<.0001 
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Appendix XIII 
GAP Distribution Hypothesis Results for Model 2 
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable GAP 
Classified by Variable Region 
Region N 
Sum of 
Scores 
Expected 
Under 
H0 
Std Dev 
Under 
H0 
Mean 
Score 
Latin America 121 25504.50 32307 1488.02 210.78 
MENA 108 21033.50 28836 1427.82 194.75 
East Asia 86 25784.00 22962 1306.68 299.81 
South Asia 143 61664.50 38181 1573.87 431.22 
Sub-Saharan Africa 75 8324.50 20025 1235.18 110.99 
Average scores were used for ties. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Chi-Square 283.8852 
DF 4 
Pr > Chi-
Square 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
